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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays which examine the importance of common
institutional ownership of industry rivals for firm financial policy and product market
interactions.
In the first chapter, I use data on all public firms in the U.S. and their owners to
construct a ”modified Herfindahl-Hirschman index” (MHHID) of market concentra-
tion that is firm-specific and based on the network of institutional ownership between
rival firms. I find that increases in MHHID lead to lower firm cash holdings. My find-
ings are consistent with theories which predict that firms facing a lower competitive
threat can a↵ord to maintain lower cash bu↵ers. To address potential endogeneity
concerns, I exploit a shock to common ownership stemming from outflows associated
with a large mutual fund scandal in 2003.
In the second chapter, I provide evidence showing that firm pairwise common
ownership leads to an increase in rival coordination. I find that pairs of commonly
held firms move closer together in product space. These findings are supportive of
collaboration theories of common ownership and inconsistent with anti-competitive
theories. I further show that when MMHID increases, firms di↵erentiate their prod-
ucts from their rivals. This result is consistent with theories according to which lower
v
competition relaxes constraints and reduces uncertainty and enables firms to choose
a more unique product market strategy. The result is inconsistent with escape-the-
competition theories of product di↵erentiation. To address potential endogeneity
concerns, I exploit exogenous outflows resulting from the 2003 mutual fund scandal.
In the third chapter, I propose a new identification strategy, which can be used
to study the e↵ects of MHHID. My strategy has substantially better time-series and
cross-sectional coverage relative to previously used instruments. Specifically, I first
identify mutual funds that are exposed to under-performing industries and are likely
to face outflows. Then, I calculate the proportion of the MHHID such exposed funds
are responsible for in una↵ected industries. I show that this ratio strongly predicts
future changes in MHHID, cash holdings and product market di↵erentiation. Building
on the same strategy, I also find that commonly held firms move closer together in
product space.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Common Ownership, Competition and
Firm Financial Policy
1.1 Introduction
Despite the rapid development of financial markets numerous studies still report that
credit disruptions have real e↵ects on firm investment and employment (Chodorow-
Reich (2014); Schwert (2016); Chava and Purnanandam (2011)). In a world with
capital market imperfections the intertemporal management of financial flexibility
can help firms better withstand economic shocks. When credit is scarce, firms can
benefit from their accumulated cash holdings to finance new projects, expenses and
unexpected losses. In a survey of 1050 CFOs, Campello et al. (2010) find that firms
which report being unconstrained maintain the same level of cash balances during the
2007-2008 financial crisis. In contrast, those which report being constrained decrease
their liquid reserves by one-fifth. Understanding the determinants of financial policies
is therefore of prime importance for understanding how firms respond to financial
distress.
Competition has been proposed as one of the main drivers of firm financial policy
(Morellec et al. (2015)). It is an important factor in determining the economic en-
vironment that a firm faces. Recent work, however, shows that a crucial dimension
of competition has been missing from standard measures - common ownership links
between industry rivals (He and Huang (2014) and Azar et al. (2015)). Theory pre-
2dicts that a common owner would push industry rivals towards monopolistic outcomes
(Gordon (1990) and Salop and O’Brien (2000)). This is because such a shareholder
takes into consideration the value of all other firms in its portfolio when setting firm
strategy. As a result, firms that are owned to a greater extent by owners which also
hold their rivals are likely to face a smaller competitive threat.
My goal in this paper is to investigate the role of common ownership in determining
firm financial policy. In particular, I examine whether concentration due to common
ownership a↵ects firms’ financial policies. Theories of precautionary motives of cash
holdings assert that when external funds are costly firms hoard cash as an insurance
against negative liquidity events (Opler et al. (1999) and Morellec et al. (2015)).
A less competitive environment caused by higher common ownership decreases the
probability of such adverse events and as a result firms can a↵ord to hold lower
cash reserves. Similarly, a decrease in competition could decrease uncertainty about
the outcomes of future projects and in turn reduce firm cash holdings (Alfaro et al.
(2016)). Finally, as Alfaro et al. (2016) argue uncertainty and financial constraints
can amplify each other in a↵ecting cash holdings. Concentration due to common
ownership can a↵ect firm financial policy by decreasing both uncertainty and financial
constraints.
Examining the e↵ects of common ownership of industry rivals on firm financial
policy is especially relevant given the the dramatic recent increase in ownership con-
centration in the U.S. asset management industry. In 1980, the largest 10 investors
held 5 percent of the value of publicly listed companies, whereas in 2010 they held
21 percent. One potential reason for this increased consolidation is the rise of passive
investment strategies following mounting evidence that the typical active manager
cannot consistently beat the market’s overall performance. The rising popularity of
passive investing has enabled a few prominent indexing investors to attract a sizable
3portion of retail funds and pension money. In the process this has created a setting
in which common ownership links between industry rivals are the norm. 1
Institutional investors have been found to exert substantial influence over the
companies they hold - they can a↵ect outcomes from corporate governance to firm
transparency to investment policies (Appel et al. (2016); Harford et al. (2016); Mullins
(2014)). They can be especially e↵ective if they hold sizable stakes and have a long-
term horizon. One specific mechanism through which they they push companies
towards monopolistic outcomes is to simply make management pay dependent on rival
performance (Anton et al. (2016)). Finally, passive investors, which are responsible
for a big portion of the concentration due to common ownreship I study, might crowd
out active investors who would push firms to compete more aggressively with each
other instead of enjoying the quiet life (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)).
While precautionary theories of cash holdings predict that firm cash reserves go
down when common ownership goes up, there are alternative theories that have the
opposite predictions. First, Boot and Vladimirov (2016) argue that higher competi-
tion leads firms to speed up investment in order to keep their first mover advantage.
This leads to less hoarding of cash and more borrowing. As a result, by reducing com-
petition common ownership leads to higher cash balances and less leverage. Second,
theories of agency issues of cash holdings predict that managers prefer more free-
dom from external monitoring and that they try to achieve it by relying on internal
funds rather than on borrowing (Jensen (1986); Gao et al. (2013)). By reducing com-
petition, common ownership can eliminate valuable market discipline and increase
agency issues thereby prompting managers to increase cash holdings and decrease
leverage. Third, common ownership can a↵ect firm financial structure through its
e↵ect on future firm opportunities. In particular, it can lead to more possibilities
1For example, in 2010, Blackrock and Barclays were one of the top ten shareholders in about 70
percent of U.S. public firms.
4for collaboration among firms that are linked (He and Huang (2014), Geng et al.
(2016)). This can in turn make firms hoard cash and decrease leverage in order to
have more flexibility to take advantage of better opportunities. In sum, the e↵ect
of common ownership on firm financial policy is ultimately an empirical question as
di↵erent theories provide opposing predictions.
In this paper, I use data on all public firms in the U.S. and their owners to
construct a ”modified Herfindahl-Hirschman index” (MHHI) of market concentration
which takes into account the network of institutional ownership between rival firms.
The new feature of my measure is that it uses a locally defined industry around each
firm to calculate firm-level market concentration (Hoberg and Phillips (2016)). 2 I
find that increases in MHHI lead to lower firm cash holdings. In particular, various
estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the measure I use results
in about 8 percent reduction in cash holdings. These magnitudes are economically
meaningful and similar in size to those of previous determinants of firm financial policy
that the literature has identified (Morellec et al. (2015)). The results are robust to
using standard SIC industry definitions. Furthermore, they seem to be largely driven
by quasi-indexing investors and dedicated investors as defined in Bushee (1998). This
is important, because quasi-indexing investors are responsible for a big portion of the
industry concentration due to common ownership. Furthermore, their importance
has been growing over time.
In addition, I find that as MHHI increases firms’ usage of uncertainty related and
constraining words in 10-K filings decreases. Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) and
Bodnaruk et al. (2015) show that textual based measures are more e↵ective in pre-
dicting future adverse events than alternative measures like the age-size ratio, the KZ
2Hoberg and Phillips (2016) use textual analysis of product descriptions in firms’ 10-K filings
to calculate similarity scores between pairs of firms and define firm-centric industries. In my main
tests, I use the top third of the rivals defined in Hoberg and Phillips (2016). This enables me to
focus on the closest rivals of a given firm. The results are robust to using the full list of rivals.
5index or the Whited-Wu index. I find that a one standard deviation increase in MH-
HID leads to about 1/3 standard deviation decrease in uncertainty-related words and
to about 7/10 standard deviations decrease in constraining words. 3 These findings
are consistent with increases in industry concentration decreasing competition and
uncertainty about future project outcomes and relaxing firms’ financial constraints.
These factors then enable firms to hold lower cash reserves (Morellec et al. (2015)
and Alfaro et al. (2016)).
Identifying the e↵ect of common ownership on firm financial policy poses an em-
pirical challenge, because active managers might have private information on future
firm outcomes. They could, in theory, be willing to hold firms from the same industry
only when they expect these firms to perform better in the future. To alleviate con-
cerns about endogeneity, I use an exogenous schock to common ownership networks.
In September 2003, 25 large mutual fund families were implicated in illegal trading
practices like market timing and late trading. The investigation into these practices
and the ensuing scandal led to significant capital outflows from the funds involved.
Kisin (2010) estimates that the withdrawals lasted until December 2006 and that the
the implicated funds lost 14% of their capital in 2004 and 21% in 2005. Families
of funds involved include famous asset managers like Federated Investors, Franklin
Templeton, Deutsche Bank and others. In constructing the instrument I use, I follow
Anton et al. (2016) who study the e↵ect of industry concentration on executive com-
pensation. In particular, I define a the ratio of total MHHI held by scandal funds at
the time of the scandal and use it to predict future changes in MHHI.
This paper is related to two main strands of literature. First, it is contributes to
the literature studying the determinants of firm financial policy. More specifically,
3The measures I use are based on ovarall usage of uncertain and constraining words in 10-K
filings. I verify that the results hold with data from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), who focus
on the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of 10-Ks. The results seem driven by equity
market constraints.
6it adds to prior work that examines the interactions between product markets and
firm financial structure. A series of papers finds that there are actual product market
benefits to maintaining a more conservative financial policy as an insurance against
rival threats. For example, Haushalter et al. (2007) find that firms are more likely
to increase investment when industry-wide investment decreases and they hold more
cash. Similarly, Fresard (2010) finds that firms with higher cash holdings experience
bigger market share gains following exogenous changes to competition.
Additionally, a number of papers study whether given the advantages of more
flexible financial policies firms try to adjust their financial structure in response to
changes in the product market environment. Haushalter et al. (2007), Morellec et al.
(2015) and Hoberg et al. (2012) use di↵erent measures of competition - standard sales
based measures of concentration and changes to the similarity between a firm’s prod-
uct descriptions and its rivals’ descriptions - and find that increases in the competitive
environment lead to higher firm cash holdings. Parise (2016) finds that airlines in-
crease their debt maturity when the probability of rival entry rises. Finally, this paper
is related to the theoretical literature which studies the intertemporal adjustment of
financial flexibility as an insurance against future negative events ( Morellec et al.
(2015), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) and DeAngelo et al. (2011)). This paper
di↵ers from the above ones by focusing on a di↵erent dimension of competition - that
coming from common ownership links between industry rivals.
Second, this paper adds to the literature on common ownership. There is a grow-
ing number of papers examining the e↵ects of common ownership networks in various
settings: common ownership between lenders and borrowers (Cici et al. (2015), be-
tween di↵erent lenders of the same firm (Chu (2015a)), between lenders of a firm
and its equity holders (Chu (2015b)), between acquirers and targets (Brooks et al.
(2016)). The part of this literature that is most related to the current paper focuses
7on common ownership between industry rivals and how this a↵ects product market
outcomes. Azar (2012) and He and Huang (2014) find a positive e↵ect of common
ownership of same-industry rivals on product market performance. They argue that
their results are consistent with increased product market coordination by commonly
held rivals.
Similarly, Geng et al. (2016) find support for this coordination-based interpre-
tation of common ownership. They examine shareholder overlap across firms with
patent complementarities and find that common ownership mitigates hold-up prob-
lems between firms that cite each other and leads to more innovation. Azar et al.
(2015) and Azar et al. (2016) argue that the anti-competitive e↵ects of common
ownership manifest themselves through pricing behavior. They examine market con-
centration in the airline and banking industries respectively and find a positive impact
on prices in routes/areas with higher common ownership.
Overall, I add to the literature by examining the e↵ects of common ownership for
a broad set of industries. Most of the exisiting literature examining the e↵ects of
concentration due to common ownership (Azar et al. (2016) and Azar et al. (2015))
focuses on narrow markets like the airline and banking industries. One potential
concern with such studies is that the observed e↵ects might not generalize to the
average industry, whose products are likely more heterogenous than those o↵ered by
airlines and banks. An exception to this is a recent paper by He and Huang (2014),
which examines how common ownership a↵ects firm performance. One di↵erence of
the present paper and that of He and Huang (2014) is that I focus on a firm-level
measure of concentration due to common ownership, while they focus on a binary
measure of common ownership between a firm and its rivals. In addition, I focus on
firm financial policies thereby linking the industrial organization literature on common
ownership with the corporate finance literature on firm financial flexibility.
8The paper proceeds as follows. The next section forms the empirical hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the data, explains how the firm-level and firm-pair measures of
common ownership I employ are constructed and details the identification strategy.
Section 4 presents the baseline results and the instrumental variable results. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Hypothesis Development
Hypothesis 1: Increases in MHHID, or industry concentration due to com-
mon ownership, lead to decreases in firm cash holdings.
The hypothesis follows directly from Morellec et al. (2015) and Hoberg et al.
(2012). Firms hoard cash to insure against negative liquidity events. A more com-
petitive environment increases the probability of such adverse events and as a result
firms hold higher cash reserves. The purpose of retaining more cash is to enable firms
to react more aggressively against future competitive threats and to not have to raise
costly external financing. An implicit assumption in Hypothesis 1 is that common
ownership links between industry rivals decrease competition. This assumption is
grounded in theory. Gordon (1990) and Salop and O’Brien (2000) predict that com-
mon ownership pushes rivals towards monopolistic outcomes. When shareholders of a
given firm hold stakes in its rivals, then they internalize the negative consequences the
given firm can impose on those rivals. The assumption that competition is reduced
when the degree of common ownership increases is further supported by evidence
from specific industries where the anti-competitive actions of firms can be directly
observed. For example, Azar et al. (2015) and Azar et al. (2016) find that prices
of tickets in the airline industry and prices of bank products are respectively higher
when measures of concentration due to common ownership increase.
There are several considerations that can work against finding an e↵ect of common
9ownership of a firm and its rivals on cash holdings. First, Boot and Vladimirov (2016)
point out that precautionary theories of cash holdings focus on firms that anticipate
future opportunities and hoard cash to take advantage of those. But if a firm has
a present opportunity and delays to investment are costly because of first-mover
advantages, then the firm will hoard less cash and invest in the current period by
borrowing externally. This new perspective could potentially change the relationship
between competition and cash hoarding. In the presence of first mover advantages
to investment, higher competition can lead a firm to lose its first mover advantage.
This means that the firm would not want to delay investment and would hoard less
cash, because it would be using that cash for investment. However, another potential
mechanism in this setting is that higher competition reduces profits - by doing so it
makes delaying and hoarding less costly. As a result, if this e↵ect dominates, then
higher competition would increase cash holdings. Both of these e↵ects are reversed
in direction when common ownership increases, because competition goes down when
common ownership is high.
Second, theories of agency issues of cash holdings predict that when agency issues
are high firms would rather retain cash than distribute it to shareholders (Jensen
(1986)). Since mangers prefer more freedom from external monitoring and new fi-
nancing requires monitoring managers would hold more internal slack (Gao et al.
(2013)). Competition, in turn, can serve as disciplining device that reduces agency
frictions. By making mistakes more costly, competition reduces the probability that
managers act in a self-interested way and diminishes the need for holding extra cash
bu↵ers. In other words, according to this view, by reducing competition common
ownership leads to higher cash holdings.
Hypothesis 2: Increases in MHHID, or industry concentration due to
common ownership, lead to decreases in firm uncertainty and the degree
10
of financial constraints.
Morellec et al. (2015) argues that the profitability of assets in place and, as a
result, the risk that the firm will have to raise costly external finance, depends on
the intensity of product market competition. Similarly, Alfaro et al. (2016) argue
that financial frictions and uncertainty interact in determining firm financial policy.
They show that if the future is uncertain and it is expensive to use debt or equity
funding, firms increase their cash holdings. Increases in concentration due to common
ownership can directly influence the riskiness of firms’ projects and their ability to
raise external finance.
1.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 Data
I use data from 1996 to 2013. I include public firms with data in both COMPUSTAT
and CRSP. Aghion et al. (2013) report irregularities with the ownership data prior
to 1991. I restrict the sample further to 1996 to 2013 so that I can take advantage
of recent industry classifications that start in 1996 (Hoberg and Phillips (2016)).
However, the results are robust to extending the sample back to 1980 by just focusing
on the standard SIC industry classifications. I drop utilities and financial firms. I
further require that firm-year observations included have controls for all of the main
variables of interest. Finally, I drop industries with two or less firms in an industry.
To construct the investor ownership variables in this paper, I use the Thomson-
Reuters 13F database. All organizations with portfolios of more than $100 million
are required by the SEC to report quarterly holdings. I restrict attention to blocks
of ownership that are greater or equal to 0.5%. The results are similar if I include all
ownership blocks. I calculate the common ownership variable and other institutional
holding variables as an average over their quarterly values for the respective year
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of interest. The 13-F data does not include ownership by individuals and small
institutions. This is likely going to introduce noise in measuring common ownership
and bias the analysis against finding a result. In addition, I use data from Bushee
(1998) on investor classifications in the 13F dataset. Investors are divided in groups
to capture portfolio diversification, turnover and momentum.
In addition to the standard SIC industry classification, I also use data from Hoberg
and Phillips (2016). They extract product descriptions from 10-K filings of all public
firms. The SEC requires firm to accurately describe their products. Using those
descriptions Hoberg and Phillips (2016) calculate the product similarity for every
pair of firms - a real number in the interval [0,1]. In the Text-based Network Industry
Classifications (TNIC) data of Hoberg and Phillips (2016) competitors are firm centric
with each firm having its own distinct set of competitors. Using the TNIC data allows
me to trace the product similarity of pairs of firms over time. This is because the
TNIC data includes similarity scores for each pair of firms included.
The advantage of using TNIC data is that it is updated annually in accordance
to the dynamic adjustment of products firms do. Furthermore, Hoberg and Phillips
(2016) show that in comparison to SIC and NAICS industry classifications, TNIC
o↵ers economically large improvements in their ability to explain variation in firm
profitability, sales growth, and market risk across industries.
1.3.2 Variable Construction
In this section I define the concentration measures I use in greater detail.
The measure of concentration due to common ownership that I use is based on
firms’ optimization problems and the weight they put on rivals’ performance. It was
firs proposed by Salop and O’Brien (2000). There are N firms and M owners. Investor
i owns  i,j percent in firm j. Firm j’s maximization problem takes into account the
profit maximization of all of its owners which also own other firms in the industry:
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max
s
⇧j =
MX
i=1
 i,j
NX
k=1
 i,k⇡k (1.1)
Changing the order of the summation, taking ⇡k out of the second sum and di-
viding by  i,j i,j (1) can be rewritten as:
max
s
⇧j = ⇡j +
X
k 6=j
P
i  i,k i,jP
i  i,j i,j
⇡k (1.2)
The first term gives the weight firm j puts on it own profits and the second term -P
i  i,k i,jP
i  i,j i,j
- gives the weight the firm puts on its rivals’ profits. The weight firms put on
rivals’ profits makes intuitive sense - it is increasing in the extent of common ownership
(the term in the numerator) and is also decreasing in the ownership concentration of
the firm itself.
Applying the model to a Cournot set-up gives us the following first-order condition:
MX
i=1
 i,j
⇢
 i,j[P (X)  Cj(xj)] +
NX
k=1
 i,kP
0
(X)xk
 
(1.3)
P (X) is the inverese demand function, C(x) is the cost function and xj is the
good. This first order condition tells us that each shareholder balances the benefit
of an increase in quantity produced at a given firm with the loss associated with the
corresponding price decrease across all firms.
In equilibrium, the above first-order condition can be rewritten as follows:
X
j
sj
P   Cj(xj)
P
=
1
⌫
X
j
X
k
sjsk
P
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
 
(1.4)
where sj is firm j’s market share and ⌫ is the price elasticity of demand. This
equation says that the market-share weighted average mark-up is proportional to
HHI.
Salop and O’Brien (2000) propose using a more general measure of market con-
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centration that takes into account the ownership structure of firms. This measure is
based on the above equation and is defined as follows:
MHHI =
X
j
X
k
sjsk
P
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
(1.5)
It can be further broken down into HHI and a concentration term that is solely
due to common ownership:
MHHI = HHI +
X
j
X
k 6=j
sjsk
P
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
(1.6)
Azar et al. (2015) label this common ownership term MHHID, or the MHHI delta:
MHHID =
X
j
X
k 6=j
sjsk
P
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
(1.7)
I define three additional terms, which compute the MHHI delta based on the
type of investors responsible for common ownership between rival firms. The clas-
sification is borrowed from Bushee (1998). He assigns investors into three groups:
quasi-indexing, dedicated and transient.
In specific, Bushee (1998) first defines nine variables to capture portfolio diver-
sification, turnover and momentum. To reduce the dimensionality of the data and
combine the nine characteristics into a parsimonious set of linear combinations Bushee
(1998) uses factor analysis. The resulting factors capture the average size of an in-
vestor’s stake in its firms, the degree of portfolio turnover and momentum (or the
trading sensitivity to current earnings news) . Then he uses k-means cluster analysis
to classify investors into di↵erent groups depending on their behavior according to
these three factors. Quasi-indexing investors have high diversification, low turnover
and low momentum. Dedicated institutions have high concentration, low turnover,
and almost no sensitivity to to current earnings (zero momentum). Transient institu-
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tions have the highest turnover and highest use of momentum strategies along with
relatively high diversification.
One potential concern with these classifications is that investors might switch from
one category to another. In fact, Bushee (1998) finds that the first-order autocorrela-
tion in the classifications is about 0.8. To ameliorate concerns about di↵erent biases
introduced by such switching of investors, Bushee updates the original classification
by finding the modal investor category for each investor and assigning it to every year
for the same fund manager. This approach, therefore, makes sure that investors in
the classification show up in the same category throughout the available data.
The MHHIDQ, MHHIDD and MHHIDT terms, corresponding to the part of MH-
HID due to quasi-indexing, dedicated and transient investors, are defined below:
MHHIDQ =
X
j
X
k 6=j
sjsk
PQuasi Indexing
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
(1.8)
MHHIDD =
X
j
X
k 6=j
sjsk
PDedicated
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
(1.9)
MHHIDT =
X
j
X
k 6=j
sjsk
PTransient
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
(1.10)
The di↵erence between the terms is based on whether the summation over in-
vestors in the term
P
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
is done over all types of investors or over a particular
type.
An important factor in constructing the MHHID variables defined above is de-
termining which industry definition to use. Hoberg and Phillips (2016) construct
industry definitions (TNIC) based on textual analysis of firms’ 10-K filings. For each
firm, they define a list of its closest rival based on a similarity score between the
product descriptions of each pair of firms. They find that relative to other industry
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classifications (SIC and NAICS), their text-based classification o↵ers an economically
large improvement in its ability to explain di↵erences in profitability, sales growth
and market risk. For this reason, my main tests rely on their industry definitions.
In specific, I use the top third of the rivals in the textual based classification of
Hoberg and Phillips (2016). Selecting the top third of the rivals ensures that I capture
the most relevant set of competitors. Furthermore, it means that in calculating market
concentration, I average over a smaller set of rivals. This turns out to be important
when I construct instrumental variables - it gives more power to my tests. Using the
data from Hoberg and Phillips (2016) also gives me the ability to construct a measure
of concentration that is specific to each firm.
In robustness tests, I also construct MHHID for the full set of rivals in TNIC. I
further use the SIC industries to build an industry-level measure. Finally, to con-
struct the above measures I restrict the ownership stakes considered to those above
a threshold of 0.5%. This is done for computational reasons, but also because stakes
below this threshold are unlikely to matter in influencing firm decisions. For robust-
ness, I also show some results with a measure that takes into account all ownership
stakes.
1.3.3 Summary statistics
This section provides descriptive statistics for the variables I use. They are shown in
Table 1.1. The sample includes all public U.S. firms with available data from 1996
to 2013. I winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimize
the e↵ect of outliers. TNIC MHHID Top Third 0.5% is the MHHID measure based
on the top third of the list of rivals in Hoberg and Phillips (2016). It is computed by
imposing a minimum threshold of 0.5% on the ownership stakes considered. It has a
mean of 0.18 and a standard deviation of 0.11. Table 1.1 further shows a breakdown
of this measure into three parts based on the investor types responsible for it: quasi-
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
TNIC MHHID Top Third 0.5% 0.187 0.117 0.097 0.178 0.267
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third 0.5% 0.139 0.100 0.062 0.122 0.198
TNIC MHHIDD Top Third 0.5% 0.021 0.028 0.002 0.012 0.027
TNIC MHHIDT Top Third 0.5% 0.026 0.034 0.004 0.013 0.031
TNIC MHHID Top Third 0% 0.223 0.148 0.119 0.210 0.304
TNIC MHHID All 0.5% 0.248 0.128 0.153 0.243 0.334
SIC300 MHHID 0.5% 0.238 0.119 0.150 0.233 0.325
HHI Top Third 0.331 0.226 0.156 0.270 0.454
Institutional Ownership 0.469 0.308 0.184 0.464 0.738
Cash 0.203 0.237 0.027 0.102 0.298
MB 2.222 2.968 1.123 1.505 2.322
Firm Size 5.678 2.042 4.185 5.599 7.071
Cash Flow -0.024 0.416 -0.007 0.061 0.105
Net Working Capital 0.047 0.295 -0.049 0.040 0.170
Capex 0.083 0.093 0.024 0.052 0.106
Book Leverage 0.235 0.269 0.023 0.186 0.355
Dividend Dummy 0.295 0.456 0.000 0.000 1.000
RD 0.889 0.314 1.000 1.000 1.000
Industry Sigma Top Third 0.115 0.137 0.035 0.064 0.126
Industry Sigma 0.127 0.147 0.042 0.072 0.141
This table shows the summary statistics for the variables used. Displayed are the mean,
the standard deviation and the first, second and third quartile. The sample consists of
all U.S. public firms with available data during the period 1996-2013. All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. All variables are defined in the
appendix.
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indexing, dedicated and transient investors. The TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third 0.5%
measure, which is the one based on quasi-indexers has a substantially higher mean
and standard deviation than the other two and is, therefore, responsible for most
of the level and variation of TNIC MHHID Top Third 0.5%. TNIC MHHIDQ Top
Third 0.5% has a mean of 0.13 and a standard deviation of 0.1. In contrast, TNIC
MHHIDD Top Third 0.5% and TNIC MHHIDT Top Third 0.5% have means of 0.02
and standard deviations of about 0.03.
Figure 1·1 shows the time-series evolution of the TNIC MHHID Top Third 0.5%
measure and its breakdown by types of investors. TNIC MHHID Top Third 0.5%
was 0.14 in 1997 and 0.17 in 2013, reaching a peak of 0.21 in 2012. As previously
noted, a big part of TNIC MHHID Top Third 0.5% is due to quasi-indexing investors.
Dedicated and transient investors seem to constitute a small part to MHHID. An
exception is the 20010-2012 period, when MHHID due to transient investors jumps
to about 0.08.
The table also shows summary statistics for several of the MHHID robustness
measures I consider. TNIC MHHID Top Third 0% is defined the same way as TNIC
MHHID Top Third 0% except it also considers common ownership links below the
0.5% threshold. As expected, this measure has a slightly higher mean and standard
deviation than TNIC MHHID Top Third 0%. Further, the table shows that the
mean and standard deviations of TNIC MHHID All 0.5% and SIC300 MHHID 0.5%
are somewhat higher, but in line with the ones of my preferred measure - TNIC
MHHID Top Third 0%. Finally, institutional ownership has a mean of 44 percent
and a standard deviation of 30 percent. This is consistent with the values reported
in Harford et al. (2016).
Figure 1·2 shows the time-series evolution of all of the MHHID robustness mea-
sures. They seem to move together with each other
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The summary statistics of the other controls seem consistent with their values in
the literature. The cash over assets ratio has a mean of 20 percent and a standard
deviation of about 23 percent. Leverage has mean of 23 percent and a standard
deviation of 22 percent. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the top third list of
rivals based on Hoberg and Phillips (2016) has a mean of 0.331 and a standard
deviation of 0.226. The size of the firms in my sample is, on average, 5.6 billion
in 2004 prices with a standard deviation of 2 billion. Cash Flow has a mean of
-1.2 percent of total assets and a standard deviation of 26 percent. Net Working
Capital has a mean of 6 percent of assets and a standard deviation of 20 percent.
Capex (capital expenditures including acquisitions) has a mean of 10 percent and a
standard deviation of 12 percent. The Dividend Dummy has a mean of 27 percent.
The R&D Dummy has a mean of 88 percent. Industry Sigma, or the industry mean
of the standard deviations of cash flows over assets for the past 10 years, is 0.13.
Return on Assets has a mean of 1.6 percent and a standard deviation of 70 percent.
Cash Flow Volatility has a mean of 0.11 and a standard deviation of 0.74.
1.3.4 Baseline empirical specifications
The main empirical specification I look at in my firm-level analysis is given below. It
is based on Harford et al. (2012), who examine the e↵ects of institutional ownership
on firm financial policy and it is in line with other papers in the literature.
Cashi,t =  MHHIi,t + ✓Xi,t + ↵t +  i + "i,t (1.11)
The controls in the cash regressions - Xi,t - are from Bates et al. (2013). In partic-
ular, I control for the market-to-book ratio (better opportunities require more cash),
firm size (economies of scale to cash holdings), cash flow to assets, net working capital
to assets (assets that could substitute for cash), capital expenditures and acquisitions
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Figure 1·1: MHHID Top Third 0.5% - Bushee
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This figure shows MHHID computed based on the top third of the rivals
in TNIC - MHHID Top Third. A minimum threshold of 0.5% is imposed
when computing ownership stakes in the MHHID formula. In addition, the
figure shows MHHIDQ, MHHIDD and MHHIDT. These are concentration
measures based on quasi-indexing, dedicated and transient investors.
to assets (capital can create assets used as collateral and reduce need for cash or
capital investment could proxy for investment opportunities), leverage (cash might
be used to relax constraints imposed by leverage), industry cash flow risk (greater
risk leads to more precautionary cash holdings), dividend payout dummy (if divi-
dend paying are less constrained precautionary cash holdings will be less important
to them ), R&D dummy ( R&D could proxy for opportunities or greater costs of fi-
nancial distress). In addition, I also control for the competitiveness of the industry in
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Figure 1·2: MHHID: TNIC Top Third, TNIC All and SIC
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This figure shows MHHID computed based on three di↵erent industry defi-
nitions - SIC, Top Third TNIC and TNIC. A minimum threshold of 0.5% is
imposed when computing ownership stakes in the MHHID formula for SIC
and TNIC All. Top Third TNIC MHHI is computed in two di↵erent ways -
with and without imposing the 0.5% threshold.
which a firm operates, for institutional ownership and for institutional concentration.
Further, in some specifications I also include controls for the rivals of a particular firm
- the average institutional ownership and the average market to book ratio. Finally,
↵t are time fixed e↵ects and  i are firm fixed e↵ects.
1.3.5 Identification strategy: The 2003 Mutual Fund Scandal
In this section, I describe the identification strategy I use.
Identifying the e↵ects of concentration due to common ownership on firm finan-
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cial policy poses an empirical challenge. Active fund managers might have private
information on future firm outcomes. They could, for example, be willing to hold
more firms from the same industry (and not be diversifying instead) only when they
expect that those firms will perform better in the future. As a result, when expected
profitability changes, MHHID measures could change due to investors shifting their
holdings towards profitable industries and away from unprofitable ones. This could be
especially true for transient investors. As Bushee (1998) explains transient investors
have high trading sensitivity to current earnings news. As a result, such a concern is
especially valid for them.
Better future performance could, in turn, be associated with lower cash holdings.
This could be the case if firms maintain smaller defense bu↵ers when they expect to
do better. However, such a mechanical relationship between firm performance and
financial policy does not seem to be holding up in the data. For example, the market-
to-book ratio is positively associated with cash holdings and negatively associated
with leverage. The interpretation of these coe cients given in the literature is that
firms which expect to have higher future opportunities preserve more financial flexibil-
ity to take advantage of those opportunities. Further, current performance measures
also seem to be positively associated with cash - results that are in contrast to what
I find about the relationship between MHHI and cash holdings in the cross-section.
To further ameliorate any remaining concerns about the causality of my results,
I exploit an identification strategy based on Anton and Polk (2014). In September
2003, 25 large mutual fund families were implicated in illegal trading practices like
market timing and late trading. The investigation into these practices and the ensuing
scandal led to substantial capital outflows from the funds. Kisin (2010) estimates that
the withdrawals lasted until December 2006 and that the the implicated funds lost
14% of their capital in 2004 and 21% in 2005. Families of funds involved include
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famous asset managers like Federated Investors, Franklin Templeton, Deutsche Bank
and others.
In constructing the instrument I use, I follow Anton et al. (2016) who study the
e↵ect of industry concentration on executive compensation. In particular, I define
the ratio of total MHHI held by scandal funds at the time of the scandal and use
it to predict future changes in MHHI. First, I define MHHIDscandal2003 as the scandal
MHHID in September 2003, where the sum in the numerator is only over scandal
funds, while the sum in the denominator is over all funds.
MHHIDscandal2003 =
X
j
X
k 6=j
sjsk
Pscandal
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
(1.12)
Then, I define Ratio as the ratio of MHHIDscandal2003 and MHHID in September
2003.
Ratio =
MHHIDscandal2003
MHHID2003
(1.13)
This instrument is likely to be both relevant and to satisfy the exclusion restriction.
A higher Scandal Ratio means that a bigger portion of a given firm’s MHHID is
susceptible to changes. As scandal funds experience outflows, other investors are
likely to buy the shares these funds sell. Depending on the other holdings of these
new buyers future MHHID could either increase or decrease. What is certain, however,
is that such high scandal ratio firms are likely to experience bigger changes in future
MHHID. The identifying assumption is that the Scandal Ratio in 2003 is not related to
the financial policies firms were planning on implementing in the following two years.
This is a reasonable assumption since the scandal was related to fund managers’
policies of allowing certain clients to trade fund shares in after hours and not to the
behavior of their portfolio firms.
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1.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the main empirical results of the paper.
1.4.1 Cash Holdings and MHHI
Table 1.2 shows the results of common ownership on firm cash holdings. The de-
pendent variable is the cash to assets ratio. The results are also robust to using the
logarithm of cash over net assets. In fact, the magnitudes of the estimates on the
common ownership variable are larger when I use the logarithm of cash over net as-
sets. However, I present the more conservative estimates. All of the variables in the
table are standardized so that each coe cient should be interpreted as showing the
e↵ect of a one standard deviation change in the independent variable.
The results show support for the precautionary theories of cash holdings - firms
seem to cut their cash holdings as MHHID increases. Columns 1 and 2 show the
baseline results using MHHI due to all institutional investors. Column 1 includes no
extra controls, while columns 2 does. Both columns show that the main variable of
interest - MHHID - is negative and highly statistically significant. The magnitude
of the coe cient suggests that a one standard deviation increase in MHHID leads to
about 0.4 percent increase in cash holdings. Columns 3 and 4 show the Bushee break-
down of MHHID according to investor types - quasi-indexer, dedicated and transient.
Columns 3 includes no extra controls, while Column 4 does. A one standard deviation
increase in MHHIDQ and MHHIDD lead to about 0.4 and 0.3 percent decrease in
cash holdings. In contrast, increases in MHHIDT - concentration due to transient
investors - lead to increases in cash holdings. Given that transient investors are mo-
mentum traders, this result might be due to such investors buying in anticipation of
good firm opportunities. If firms hoard cash to take advantage of such opportunities,
this would explain the observed relation.
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Table 1.2: Cash Holdings and Top Third TNIC MHHI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Cash Cash Cash
TNIC MHHID Top Third -0.040 -0.036
(0.009)⇤⇤⇤ (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -0.048 -0.042
(0.010)⇤⇤⇤ (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDD Top Third -0.125 -0.114
(0.028)⇤⇤⇤ (0.027)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDT Top Third 0.107 0.088
(0.031)⇤⇤⇤ (0.030)⇤⇤⇤
HHI Top Third -0.012 -0.015 -0.010 -0.014
(0.005)⇤⇤ (0.005)⇤⇤⇤ (0.005)⇤⇤ (0.005)⇤⇤⇤
Observations 53380 53380 53380 53380
R2 0.822 0.839 0.823 0.839
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the MHHI variables. Cash
holdings are defined as the ratio of cash and short-term investments to assets. The
MHHI variables are constructed at the firm level and are based on the Top Third
of the rivals of a given firm in the Text-based Network Industry Classifications
by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). A threshold of 0.5% is imposed when calculating
ownership levels. Columns 1 and 2 show the baseline results using MHHI due to
all institutional investors. Columns 3 and 4 show the Bushee breakdown of MHHI
according to investor types - quasi-indexer, dedicated and transient. Columns 1
and 3 include no extra controls, while columns 2 and 4 include extra controls. The
controls are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. The sample consists
of all U.S. public firms with available data during the period 1996-2013. All variables
are defined in the appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and
the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and within-
firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; *
denotes 10% significance.
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For similar reasons, it is possible that the OLS results on MHHIDQ and MHHIDD
are biased. If MHHIDQ and MHHIDD increase prior to better industry performance,
because investors buy ahead of good opportunities, firms would hoard cash to take
advantage of such opportunities. As a result the coe cient estimates on MHHIDQ
and MHHIDD would be biased towards 0.
The size and the sign of the coe cients of the other control variables included
seem largely in line with the literature. The MB ratio, Cash Flow, R&D and Industry
Sigma are positively associated with cash holdings. This agrees with the expectation
that firms with better opportunities need to hoard cash to be able to take advantage
of those opportunities, that more innovative firms need more cash to finance their
R&D activities, and that firms operating in more risky industries use cash as a bu↵er
against uncertain industry conditions. Firm size, Net Working Capital, Capex and
Leverage are negatively associated with cash holdings. These coe cients are in line
with some of the explanations given in the literature: firm size accounts for economies
of scale in cash holdings, net working capital is a substitute for cash, capital provides
firms with collateral to borrow against and high leverage forces firm to use cash to
relax the constraints imposed by it (Bates et al. (2013)).
1.4.2 Cash Holdings and MHHI: Robustness
In this section, I show that the results are robust to using di↵erent industry classi-
fications to construct concentration measures due to common ownership. I further
show that the results are robust to not imposing a 0.5% cut-o↵ on ownership stakes.
Table 1.3 again shows regressions of firm cash holdings on the MHHI variables.
In this table, the MHHI variables are based on the full list of rivals in the Text-based
Network Industry Classifications by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). Columns 1 and 2
show the baseline results using MHHI due to all institutional investors. Columns
3 and 4 show the Bushee breakdown of MHHI according to investor types - quasi-
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indexer, dedicated and transient. Columns 1 and 3 include no extra controls, while
columns 2 and 4 include extra controls. The results are meant as a robustness check
and are largely consistent with the ones based on the Top Third of the rivals in the
Text-based Network Industry Classifications by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). Increases
in MHHID lead to decreases in cash holdings. This results holds for MHHI due to
both quasi-indexing and dedicated investors. As before, it is reversed for transient
investors.
Table 1.4 shows the same regressions but this time the MHHI variables are based
on the SIC classifications. The results are meant are largely consistent with the ones
based on the Top Third of the rivals in the Text-based Network Industry Classifi-
cations by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). Increases in MHHID lead to decreases in
cash holdings. Again, this results holds for MHHID due to both quasi-indexing and
dedicated investors and is reversed for transient investors.
Finally, Table 1.5 repeats the same exercise, but this time the MHHID variables
are based on the Top Third of list of rivals in the Text-based Network Industry
Classifications by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). The di↵erence from before is that no
ownership threshold is imposed when calculating MHHID. Columns 1 and 2 show the
baseline results using MHHID due to all institutional investors. Columns 3 and 4
show the Bushee breakdown of MHHID according to investor types - quasi-indexer,
dedicated and transient. Columns 1 and 3 include no extra controls, while columns
2 and 4 include extra controls. The results are again consistent with the the ones
when a threshold of 0.5 % is used to calculate MHHID. Increases in MHHID lead to
decreases in cash holdings. This further holds for MHHID due to both quasi-indexing
and dedicated investors, but is reversed for MHHID due to transient investors.
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Table 1.3: Cash Holdings and TNIC MHHI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Cash Cash Cash
TNIC MHHID All -0.036 -0.029
(0.009)⇤⇤⇤ (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ All -0.020 -0.020
(0.010)⇤⇤ (0.010)⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDD All -0.159 -0.159
(0.029)⇤⇤⇤ (0.029)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDT All 0.069 0.069
(0.031)⇤⇤ (0.031)⇤⇤
Sales HHI -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 53590 53590 55457 55457
R2 0.822 0.839 0.835 0.835
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the MHHI variables.
Cash holdings are defined as the ratio of cash and short-term investments
to assets. The MHHI variables are constructed at the firm level and are
based on the Text-based Network Industry Classifications by Hoberg and
Phillips (2016). A threshold of 0.5% is imposed when calculating ownership
levels. Columns 1 and 2 show the baseline results using MHHI due to all
institutional investors. Columns 3 and 4 show the Bushee breakdown of
MHHI according to investor types - quasi-indexer, dedicated and transient.
Columns 1 and 3 include no extra controls, while columns 2 and 4 include
extra controls. The controls are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted
for brevity. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available data
during the period 1996-2013. All variables are defined in the appendix.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The
estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error
clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * de-
notes 10% significance.
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Table 1.4: Cash Holdings and SIC MHHI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Cash Cash Cash
SIC300 MHHID -0.050 -0.039
(0.009)⇤⇤⇤ (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
SIC300 MHHIDQ -0.037 -0.037
(0.010)⇤⇤⇤ (0.010)⇤⇤⇤
SIC300 MHHIDD -0.065 -0.065
(0.022)⇤⇤⇤ (0.022)⇤⇤⇤
SIC300 MHHIDT 0.011 0.011
(0.027) (0.027)
HHI SIC 300 -0.069 -0.041 -0.040 -0.040
(0.017)⇤⇤⇤ (0.013)⇤⇤⇤ (0.013)⇤⇤⇤ (0.013)⇤⇤⇤
Observations 56007 56007 56007 56007
R2 0.387 0.533 0.533 0.533
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the MHHI vari-
ables. Cash holdings are defined as the ratio of cash and short-term
investments to assets. The MHHI variables are constructed at the indus-
try level and are based on the SIC industries. A threshold of 0.5% is
imposed when calculating ownership levels. Columns 1 and 2 show the
baseline results using MHHI due to all institutional investors. Columns 3
and 4 show the Bushee breakdown of MHHI according to investor types -
quasi-indexer, dedicated and transient. Columns 1 and 3 include no extra
controls, while columns 2 and 4 include extra controls. The controls are
from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. The sample consists
of all U.S. public firms with available data during the period 1996-2013.
All variables are defined in the appendix. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for
error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1%
significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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Table 1.5: Cash Holdings and Top Third TNIC MHHI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Cash Cash Cash
TNIC MHHID Top Third -0.029 -0.024
(0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.005)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -0.042 -0.034
(0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.006)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDD Top Third -0.129 -0.118
(0.028)⇤⇤⇤ (0.028)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDT Top Third 0.106 0.089
(0.025)⇤⇤⇤ (0.024)⇤⇤⇤
HHI Top Third -0.011 -0.014 -0.010 -0.013
(0.005)⇤⇤ (0.004)⇤⇤⇤ (0.005)⇤⇤ (0.005)⇤⇤⇤
Observations 53380 53380 53380 53380
R2 0.823 0.839 0.823 0.839
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the MHHI variables. Cash
holdings are defined as the ratio of cash and short-term investments to assets. The
MHHI variables are constructed at the firm level and are based on the Top Third
of the rivals of a given firm in the Text-based Network Industry Classifications by
Hoberg and Phillips (2016). No threshold is imposed when calculating ownership
levels in MHHID. Columns 1 and 2 show the baseline results using MHHI due to
all institutional investors. Columns 3 and 4 show the Bushee breakdown of MHHI
according to investor types - quasi-indexer, dedicated and transient. Columns 1
and 3 include no extra controls, while columns 2 and 4 include extra controls. The
controls are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. The sample consists
of all U.S. public firms with available data during the period 1996-2013. All variables
are defined in the appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and
the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and within-
firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; *
denotes 10% significance.
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1.4.3 Firm-Level Instrumental Variable Strategy: The 2003 Mutual Fund
Scandal
As I argued previously the 2003 mutual fund scandal provides a useful setting to study
common ownership. I follow Anton et al. (2016) and define the ratio of total MHHID
held by scandal funds to total MHHID at the time of the scandal and use it to predict
future changes in MHHID. A higher Scandal Ratio means that a bigger portion of a
given firm’s MHHID is susceptible to changes. As scandal funds experience outflows,
other investors are likely to buy the shares these funds sell. Depending on the other
holdings of these new buyers future MHHID could either increase or decrease. What
is certain, however, is that such high scandal ratio firms are likely to experience bigger
changes in future MHHID.
Table 1.6 shows regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented concen-
tration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. I focus on MHHID and MHHIDQ as
MHHIDQ represents the biggest part of MHHID. As an instrument, I use a dummy
for cases where the fraction of MHHID held by scandal funds in 2003 is above the
50th percentile. A further control is included for the level of MHHID in 2003: TNIC
MHHID 2003. Columns 1 and 2 show the first stages of the regression. Columns 3
and 4 show the respective second stages. The first stage results show that the scandal
ratio dummy strongly predicts future changes in MHHID and MHHIDQ. The sec-
ond stage results confirm the conclusions based on the cross-sectional regressions -
MHHID strongly and negatively a↵ects firm cash holdings.
Columns 2 and 4 show that the instrumented MHHID now has a bigger estimated
impact on firm cash holdings than in the OLS regressions. A one standard deviation
increase in the MHHID leads to a decrease in firm cash holdings of about 10 percent.
As I explained before, this increase in the magnitude of the coe cient could be due
to the fact that the OLS results are biased towards 0. If investors buy firms ahead
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of the revelation of good opportunities and if firms hoard cash to take advantage of
those opportunities, the OLS regressions would be biased.
Table 1.7 also presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented con-
centration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. This time the instrument is the fraction
of MHHI held by scandal funds in 2003. As before, a further control is included for
the level of MHHID in 2003: TNIC MHHID 2003. Columns 1 and 2 show the first
stages of the regression. Columns 3 and 4 show the respective second stages. This
table is meant as a robustness check. The di↵erence from 1.6 is that Table 1.7 uses a
continuous scandal ratio. The significance and magnitudes of the coe cient estimates
are consistent with the ones from before.
In summary, the instrumental variable results suggest that firms adjust their finan-
cial flexibility when the concentration of the industry in which they operate changes as
a result of changes in common ownership with industry rivals. The results seem con-
sistent with a story that combines the implications of theories of the anti-competitive
e↵ects of common ownership (Gordon (1990) and Salop and O’Brien (2000)) and the-
ories of the intertemporal adjustment of firm financial policy as an insurance mech-
anism against potential adverse events (Morellec et al. (2015) and DeAngelo et al.
(2011)).
1.4.4 Possible Mechanisms: Uncertainty and Constraints
Morellec et al. (2015) argues that the profitability of assets in place and, as a result,
the risk that the firm will have to raise costly external finance, depends on the intensity
of product market competition. Similarly, Alfaro et al. (2016) argue that financial
frictions and uncertainty interact in determining firm financial policy. They show
that if the future is uncertain and it is expensive to use debt or equity funding, firms
increase their cash holdings. In this section, I explicitly test these mechanisms.
In specific, an increase in MHHID reduces the competitive threat firms face and,
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Table 1.6: Cash Holdings and The 2003 Mutual Fund Scandal
First Stage Second Stage
TNIC MHHID TNIC MHHIDQ Cash Cash
Top Third Top Third
Ratio Top 50% -0.015 -0.017
(0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Top Third -1.239
(0.492)⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -1.159
(0.441)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID 2003 0.314 0.280 0.449 0.384
(0.015)⇤⇤⇤ (0.015)⇤⇤⇤ (0.160)⇤⇤⇤ (0.129)⇤⇤⇤
HHI Top Third -0.199 -0.160 -0.265 -0.205
(0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.096)⇤⇤⇤ (0.070)⇤⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 21 27
Observations 4989 4989 4989 4989
R2 0.538 0.509 0.460 0.503
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented concentration measures -
MHHID and MHHIDQ. As an instrument, I use a dummy for cases where the fraction of MHHID
held by scandal funds in 2003 is above the 50th percentile. A further control is included for the level
of MHHID in 2003: TNIC MHHID 2003. Columns 1 and 2 show the first stages of the regression.
Columns 3 and 4 show the respective second stages. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with
available data during the period 2004-2005. All control variables are defined in the appendix. The
controls variables are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables
are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity
and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes
10% significance.
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Table 1.7: Cash Holdings and The 2003 Mutual Fund Scandal
First Stage Second Stage
TNIC MHHID TNIC MHHIDQ Cash Cash
Top Third Top Third
Ratio -0.385 -0.390
(0.075)⇤⇤⇤ (0.067)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Top Third -1.186
(0.471)⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -1.170
(0.453)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID 2003 0.311 0.277 0.432 0.387
(0.015)⇤⇤⇤ (0.015)⇤⇤⇤ (0.154)⇤⇤⇤ (0.133)⇤⇤⇤
HHI Top Third -0.197 -0.158 -0.255 -0.206
(0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.092)⇤⇤⇤ (0.071)⇤⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 26 33
Observations 4989 4989 4989 4989
R2 0.538 0.509 0.473 0.501
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented concentration measures -
MHHID and MHHIDQ. The fraction of MHHI held by scandal funds in 2003 is used as an instrument.
A further controls is included for the level of MHHID in 2003: TNIC MHHID 2003. Columns 1 and
2 show the first stages of the regression. Columns 3 and 4 show the respective second stages. The
sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available data during the period 2004-2005. All control
variables are defined in the appendix. The controls variables are from Bates et al. (2013) and are
omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The
estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes
1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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therefore, reduces financial frictions that firms might face. As a result, firms find it
optimal to hold less cash to insure against negative events. Another possibility is that
reduced competition means that firms face less uncertainty about future projects and
can a↵ord to hold less cash as precaution against such uncertainty.
I use the percentage of constraining and uncertain words in firms’ 10-K filings
to proxy for uncertainty and financial constraints. Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015)
and Bodnaruk et al. (2015) show that textual based measures are more e↵ective in
predicting future adverse events than alternative measures like the age-size ratio, the
KZ index or the Whited-Wu index.
Table 1.8 shows regressions of the frequency of uncertainty related words in firms’
10-K filings on the instrumented concentration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. As
before, as an instrument, I use a dummy for cases where the fraction of MHHID held
by scandal funds in 2003 is above the 50th percentile. A further control is included
for the level of MHHID in 2003: TNIC MHHID 2003. Columns 1 and 2 show the first
stages of the regression. Columns 3 and 4 show the respective second stages. The
second stage regressions show that increases in MHHID and the respective decreases
in competition lead to a decrease in the frequency of uncertainty related words in
firms’ 10-K filings. A one standard deviation increase in MHHID and MHHIDQ
leads to about a 0.0014 increase in the frequency of uncertain words. This is about
1/3 of the standard deviation of that variable.
The results seem consistent with concentration due to common ownership reducing
the uncertainty of the environment firms face and enabling them to decrease their cash
holdings.
Table 1.9shows regressions of the frequency of constraining words in firms’ 10-
K filings on the instrumented concentration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. As
before, as an instrument, I use a dummy for cases where the fraction of MHHID held
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by scandal funds in 2003 is above the 50th percentile. A further control is included
for the level of MHHID in 2003: TNIC MHHID 2003. Columns 1 and 2 show the first
stages of the regression. Columns 3 and 4 show the respective second stages. The
second stage regressions show that increases in MHHID and the respective decreases
in competition lead to a decrease in the frequency of constraining words in firms’ 10-
K filings. One standard deviation increase in MHHID and MHHIDQ leads to about
7/10 of a standard deviation decrease in the frequency of constraining words.
In sum, I find evidence that both uncertainty and financial frictions are reduced
as a result of increases in concentration due to common ownership. As argued by
Alfaro et al. (2016) and Morellec et al. (2015), these two mechanisms could explain
the drop in firms’ cash holdings.
1.5 Conclusion
The determinants of firm financial policies have been studied extensively. It is im-
portant to understand how firms adjust their financial policies, because this helps us
better understand how they are able to respond to negative shocks that a↵ect them.
Adjusting financial flexibility across periods provides a valuable tool for financing
investment, innovation and any unforeseen expenses firms might face. The relation-
ship between competition and firm financial policy has also received some attention.
Given that competition is an important determinant of the economic environment
a firm faces, it is a potential crucial driving force of firm financial policy. In this
paper, I focus on a particular dimension of competition - that coming from common
ownership of industry rivals - and its relationship with firm financial policy. I find
that firms adjust their cash holdings downwards when concentration due to common
ownership increases and therefore firms face a smaller product market threat.
The results I provide illustrate a new dimension of the recently documented trend
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of rising common ownership of industry rivals among public firms in the U.S.. The
flow of funds to passive investment strategies has been seen as a desirable consequence
from the perspective of retail investors who are now able to reap high returns while
avoiding the costs of active management. However, by leading to consolidation of
ownership in the hands of a few investors and to rising common ownership, this change
of investment patterns has come at the cost of decreased competition (Azar et al.
(2015)). The results I find are consistent with this story of decreased competition and
provide a natural bridge between the industrial organization literature on common
ownership and the corporate finance literature on firm financial flexibility. In specific,
the evidence I show seems in line with existing evidence from these two separate
strands of research.
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Table 1.8: Uncertainty and The 2003 Mutual Fund Scandal
First Stage Second Stage
TNIC MHHID TNIC MHHIDQ Percent Percent
Top Third Top Third Uncertain Words Uncertain Words
Ratio Top 50 -0.017 -0.018
(0.004)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Top Third -0.014
(0.007)⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -0.013
(0.006)⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID 2003 0.313 0.279 0.004 0.003
(0.016)⇤⇤⇤ (0.015)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤ (0.002)⇤
HHI Top Third -0.200 -0.162 -0.003 -0.003
(0.008)⇤⇤⇤ (0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 22 29
Observations 4654 4654 4654 4654
R2 0.537 0.508 0.099 0.128
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of the frequency of uncertainty related words in firms’ 10-K filings on the in-
strumented concentration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. As an instrument, I use a dummy for cases where
the fraction of MHHID held by scandal funds in 2003 is above the 50th percentile. A further control is included
for the level of MHHID in 2003: TNIC MHHID 2003. Columns 1 and 2 show the first stages of the regression.
Columns 3 and 4 show the respective second stages. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available
data during the period 2004-2005. All control variables are defined in the appendix. The controls variables are
from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and the
99% level. The estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes
1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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Table 1.9: Constraints and The 2003 Mutual Fund Scandal
First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TNIC MHHID TNIC MHHIDQ Percent Percent
Top Third Top Third Constr. Words Constr. Words
Ratio Top 50 -0.017 -0.018
(0.004)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Top Third -0.007
(0.004)⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -0.007
(0.004)⇤
TNIC MHHID 2003 0.313 0.279 0.002 0.002
(0.016)⇤⇤⇤ (0.015)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001) (0.001)
HHI Top Third -0.200 -0.162 -0.002 -0.001
(0.008)⇤⇤⇤ (0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 22 29
Observations 4654 4654 4654 4654
R2 0.537 0.508 0.075 0.113
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of the frequency of constraining words in firms’ 10-K filings on the instru-
mented concentration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. As an instrument, I use a dummy for cases where
the fraction of MHHID held by scandal funds in 2003 is above the 50th percentile. A further control is
included for the level of MHHID in 2003: TNIC MHHID 2003. Columns 1 and 2 show the first stages of
the regression. Columns 3 and 4 show the respective second stages. The sample consists of all U.S. public
firms with available data during the period 2004-2005. All control variables are defined in the appendix.
The controls variables are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables
are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity
and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10%
significance.
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Chapter 2
Common Ownership and Firm Product
Market Coordination
2.1 Introduction
The attention to the role of common ownership of industry rivals for competition
has grown enormously in the past few years. As O’Brien and Waehrer (2017) point
out, antitrust authorities in the U.S. have opened multiple investigations into the anti-
competitive e↵ects of common ownership. And competition regulators in Europe have
already incorporated measures of concentration stemming from common ownership
into their merger analysis. Therefore, understanding the e↵ects of concentration based
on common ownership on firm behavior is of crucial policy importance.
The literature has assigned somewhat conflicting interpretations to the e↵ects of
common ownership. On the one hand, Azar et al. (2015) and Azar et al. (2016)
emphasize the anti-competitive e↵ects of common ownership in raising prices in the
airline and banking industries. On the other hand, He and Huang (2014), Freeman
(2016), Kostovetsky and Manconi (2016) and Geng et al. (2016) show evidence that
common ownership can be an important bridge-building device between rival firms
and customer-supplier pairs. By ameliorating lock-up problems and improving in-
formation sharing common ownership can increase innovation and help disseminate
ideas. It can further make collaborative relationships more durable by reducing in-
formation asymmetry.
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In the first part of this paper, I provide evidence consistent with the second more
benign interpretation of common ownership. I study firm product market choices and
examine firm pairwise product space movements as the level of common ownership
between a pair of firms increases. I complement the strand of literature that finds
support for bridge-building/positive information spillover theories (He and Huang
(2014) and Kostovetsky and Manconi (2016)). I find that commonly held pairs of
firms move closer together in product space. There are a number of advantages
that firms might experience by doing so. First, such a movement would give them
the ability to share information on customer demand for particular product features
(Reichardt (1962)). Second, they can exchange technical know-how on production
processes and development. Third, they can benefit from coordinating marketing
spending and jointly increasing new product awareness and adoption by customers.
Finally, they can increase joint bargaining power with suppliers.
The increased product similarity I find between a pair of commonly held firms
is also consistent with anti-competitive theories of common ownership (Azar et al.
(2015) and Azar et al. (2016)). Hotelling-style models predict that increases in own-
ership concentration can lead rivals to close ”holes” in product space in an attempt to
preempt competitor entry (Berry and Waldfogel (2001)) or to increase product simi-
larity to more easily coordinate pricing decisions (Sweeting (2010)). To argue against
such an interpretation, I examine the above relationship in sub-samples of firms op-
erating in high and low concentration industries. The bridge-building/information
spillover and anti-competitive theories have di↵erent predictions about the strength
of the e↵ect in such sub-samples (Kostovetsky and Manconi (2016)).
The anti- competitive theories would predict that the incentive of rivals to close
holes in product space and limit competition would be stronger in less competitive
industries, because the oligopolistic profits that attract entrants would be higher in
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such industries. Similarly, if potential pricing coordination was driving the movements
in product space, the results would be stronger in less competitive industries (Azar
et al. (2015)). This is because the ability of common owners to influence pricing deci-
sions would be higher in such industries. In contrast, the bridge-building/information
spillover theories make no such predictions. In contradiction to the anti-competitive
theories, I find that the results are somewhat stronger in less competitive industries.
The magnitude of the results I find is economically large. A one standard deviation
increase in common ownership between a pair of firms leads to an increase of about
half of the standard deviation of the pairwise product similarity variable. Also, in
addition to not being supportive of anti-competitive theories of common ownership,
the results I find of increased product market similarity between pairs of commonly
held firms go against theories, which predict that common ownership could make
rival firms move further away in product space. Di↵erentiation can prevent direct
competition between firms’ products and avoid cannibalization (Berry and Waldfogel
(2001)). Some evidence in support of this hypothesis in the context of the music radio
industry and in the case of mergers is presented in Sweeting (2010).
In the second part of the paper, I examine the e↵ect of changes in industry con-
centration due to common ownership on firm-level product market strategy. Theory
is ambiguous about the importance and the direction of this e↵ect. First, high ir-
reversibility and adjustment costs associated with changing product market strategy
might make firm product di↵erentiation unresponsive to changes in competition due
to common ownership. Second, the literature on competition and innovation, which
is a useful guide in analyzing product market strategy provides ambiguous predic-
tions. One possibility is that firms facing lower competitive risk and having higher
profitability in a less competitive environment are able choose a more unique product
market strategy, because the probability of idea expropriation is lower and resources
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are higher (Gu (2016) and Autor et al. (2016)). Another possibility is that operating
in a less competitive environment reduces the incentive to di↵erentiate and escape
competition (Aghion et al. (2005) and Hoberg and Phillips (2016)).
I find that as concentration due to common ownership (MHHID) increases, firms
have less similar products to their rivals. A one standard deviation increase in MHHID
leads to a decrease of about 40 percent of the standard deviation of the average
similarity of a firm with its rivals. Taken together with the results from Chapter 1,
which show that increases in MHHID lead to decreases in usage of uncertain and
constraining words in 10-K filings, these findings can be interpreted in light of the
evidence in Gu (2016) and Autor et al. (2016). 1 As competition due to common
ownership decreases firms face less uncertainty and are less constrained. This enables
them to adopt a more risky product market strategy and di↵erentiate themselves
from rivals. 2.
In addition, to informing a new dimension of corporate policy - firm product mar-
ket strategy - my results connect with the literature on competition and innovation.
One advantage of focusing on the relationship between competition and product mar-
ket strategy is that it does not su↵er from some of the previously identified problems
with measures of innovation. As Akcigit and Liu (2016) and Abrams et al. (2013)
argue innovation has a strategic revelation element. It is possible that changes in the
competitive environment a↵ect that strategic part of innovation in ways unrelated to
actual idea generation.
To alleviate endogeneity concerns, in my firm-pair analysis, I exploit a large mutual
fund scandal that occurred in 2003 and led to outflows from a group of 25 mutual fund
families. The scandal generated su cient variation in ownership at the firm-pair level
1Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) and Bodnaruk et al. (2015) show that textual based measures
are more e↵ective in predicting future adverse events than alternative measures.
2Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) provides evidence that product market di↵erentiation is associ-
ated with higher profitability
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to be useful in this part of the analysis. In specific, I use the the proportion of total
common ownership held by scandal funds in September 2003 to predict common
ownership over the next two years. A higher such proportion for a given pair of
firms will likely lead to subsequent changes in common ownership at the firm-pair
level. This is because shares of sold firms by a given scandal fund will be bought
by another owner(s), the composition of whose portfolio(s) would determine future
levels of common ownership. The identifying assumption is that this scandal ratio is
not related to the product market strategies firms were planning on implementing in
the following two to three years. This is a reasonable assumption since the scandal
was related to fund managers’ policies of allowing certain clients to trade fund shares
in after hours and not to the behavior of their portfolio firms.
Similarly, to ameliorate endogeneity concerns in the firm-level analysis I use the
same mutual fund scandal. I define the ratio of MHHID held by scandal funds to
overall MHHID at the time of the scandal and use it to predict future changes in
MHHID. A higher Scandal Ratio means that a bigger portion of a given firm’s MHHID
is susceptible to changes. As scandal funds experience outflows, other investors are
likely to buy the shares these funds sell. Depending on the other holdings of these new
buyers future MHHID could either increase or decrease. What is certain, however,
is that such high scandal ratio firms are likely to experience bigger changes in future
MHHID.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section forms the empirical hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the data, explains how the measures of common ownership I
employ are constructed and details the identification strategy. Section 4 presents the
baseline results and the instrumental variable results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2.2 Hypothesis Development
In this section, I formulate the main hypotheses I test. The hypotheses are based on
the interaction between common ownership and two dimensions of corporate strategy.
The first dimension concerns firms’ pairwise positioning in product space in response
to increases in common ownership at the firm-pair level. The second one deals with
how firms di↵erentiate their products from rivals in response to changes in industry
concentration due to common ownership (MHHID).
Common ownership can play an important bridge-building role role at the firm-
pair level. First, as He and Huang (2014) argue common ownership can reduce infor-
mation asymmetry and possible expropriation among rivals considering collaboration.
He and Huang (2014) find that commonly held firms are more likely to form joint
ventures, strategic alliances, or within-industry acquisitions. Second, common own-
ership can improve information sharing. Kostovetsky and Manconi (2016) find that
common institutional ownership acts as a vehicle for the di↵usion of innovation. They
find that commonly held firms are more likely to cite each other. Relatedly, common
ownership can overcome the ine ciencies pointed out in Akcigit and Liu (2016) -
firms could work on dead-ends without realizing a rival has already discovered that a
particular direction is not fruitful. Finally, common ownership can help firms coordi-
nate advertising e↵orts and bargain successfully with suppliers. There are a number
of mechanisms through which these e↵ects can materialize and information could be
shared among rival firms to ease coordination. Common institutional investors might
appoint overlapping board members. They could also house financial analysts who
share information on overlapping firms. Additionally, institutional investors might
directly engage with management.
Given the evidence in favor of such an improved coordination/information sharing
role between commonly held firms, industry rivals might benefit from moving closer
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together in product space. First, such a movement would give them the ability to
share information on customer demand for particular product features (Reichardt
(1962)). Second, they can exchange technical know-how on production processes
and improvements to existing products. Third, they can benefit from coordinating
marketing spending and jointly increasing new product awareness and adoption by
customers. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Common ownership enhances collaboration possibili-
ties and information sharing between rivals firms. As a result, firms
move closer together in product space to take advantage of such positive
spillovers.
There are also theories and evidence, which predict that common ownership could
make rival firms move further away in product space. Di↵erentiation can prevent
direct competition between firms’ products and avoid cannibalization (Berry and
Waldfogel (2001)). Some evidence in support of this hypothesis in the context of the
music radio industry is presented in Sweeting (2010). This could mean that a single
owner has an incentive to push rival firms to move away from each other in product
space.
Finally, there are other potential explanations for why common ownership might
make firms move closer together in product space. These explanations follow under
a strand of the literature which claims that common ownership has anti-competitive
e↵ects (see Azar et al. (2016)). First, as Berry and Waldfogel (2001) illustrate with
a simple Hotelling-style model, crowding products together can preempt rival entry
by closing ”holes” in product space. Second, as Sweeting (2010) argues two-product
Hotelling models predict that independent firms will try to increase di↵erentiation to
avoid price competition. A natural consequence of this is that common ownership
would lead to an increase in product similarity, because firms would find it easier to
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coordinate prices when their products are more similar.
The bridge-building/positive information spillover theories and the anti competi-
tive theories have the same predictions about the relationship between common own-
ership and product market similarity. However, they have di↵erent predictions on the
strength of this relationship in markets that di↵er by the level of their existing con-
centration (Kostovetsky and Manconi (2016)). The anti-competitive theories would
predict that the incentive of rivals to close holes in product space and limit competi-
tion would be stronger in less competitive industries, because the oligopolisitc profits
that attract entrants would be higher. In contrast, the bridge-building/information
spillover theories make no such predictions. These arguments lead to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: If anti-competitive behavior rather than coordination or
information spillovers is the driving force behind the positive relationship
between common ownership and firm pair-wise product similarity, this
relationship will be stronger in less competitive industries.
In addition to a↵ecting firm-pair product market interactions, common ownership
has the potential to influence firm-level product market strategy by changing the
overall level of competitiveness of the environment in which a given firm operates.
Product market strategy is tightly linked to innovation. Therefore, the literature
on competition and innovation provides a useful guide for the relationship between
MHHID and product market strategy. For example, Hombert and Matray (2015)
uses state R&D tax credits to show that firms which innovate more are more resilient
to trade shocks. The authors argue that the e↵ects they observe can be explained
by R&D firms being able to increase product di↵erentiation. Similarly, Hoberg and
Phillips (2016) finds that firms which spend more on advertising or R&D have more
di↵erentiated products and are more profitable, consistent with these expenditures
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helping create endogenous barriers to entry.
The literature on competition and innovation provides conflicting evidence and
di↵erent mechanisms that might be at play. For example, Aghion et al. (2005) argues
that competition leads to increases in innovation through an escape-the-competition
e↵ect. This evidence is supportive of theories which predict that firms endogenously
determine their R&D to create barriers to entry. In contrast, Autor et al. (2016)
finds that competition reduces innovation and argue that a simple mechanism in
which competition induces manufacturing firms to contract their operations along
multiple margins of operation explains their results. Finally, Gu (2016) argues that
R&D projects are more likely to fail in a more competitive environment, because rival
firms could win the innovation race. This could mean that the returns to innovation
and product market di↵erentiation are higher in a less competitive environment.
While there are important similarities between innovation and product market
strategy, there are also substantial di↵erences. Product market strategy involves
making big changes to the direction a firm decides to take and to its future production
decisions. As a result product market strategy is subject to bigger irreversibility costs.
In contrast, innovation is often incremental. As D’Acunto (2014) reports 79% of the
patents filed in the United States, more than 75% of those filed in Europe, and
most of the unpatented innovation, are related to process and product improvement
in manufacturing industries. In other words, a small fraction of innovation is the
high-tech type thought to disrupt businesses significantly. In support of the claim
that there are important di↵erences between innovation and product market strategy,
Foucault and Fresard (2016) analyzes firm product uniqueness choices following IPOs
and finds that they cannot be explained by innovation.
In summary, it is an empirical question whether the results from the literature
on competition and innovation apply to firms’ product market decisions. Facing
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lower risk and having higher profitability could enable firms in a less competitive
environment to choose a more unique product market strategy (Gu (2016) and Autor
et al. (2016)). But operating in a less competitive environment can also reduce the
incentive to di↵erentiate and (Aghion et al. (2005) and and Hoberg and Phillips
(2016)). These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Increases in MHHID lead to increases in product di↵er-
entiation if the relaxation of financial frictions and reduced risk associated
with lower competition dominate the escape-the-competition e↵ect.
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Data
I use data from 1996 to 2013. I include public firms with data in both COMPUSTAT
and CRSP. Aghion et al. (2013) report irregularities with the ownership data prior
to 1991. I restrict the sample further to 1996 to 2013 so that I can take advantage of
recent industry classifications that start in 1996 (Hoberg and Phillips (2016)). I drop
utilities and financial firms. I further require that firm-year observations included
have controls for all of the main variables of interest. Finally, I drop industries with
two or less firms in an industry.
I also use their Text-based Network Industry Classifications (TNIC) data by
Hoberg and Phillips (2016). Rivals in the TNIC data are firm centric with each
firm having its own distinct set of competitors. Using the TNIC data allows me to
trace the product similarity of pairs of firms over time. This is because the TNIC
data includes similarity scores for each pair of firms included. These similarity scores
are based on textual analysis of firm’s product market description sections in their
10-K filings. The similarity score ranges between 0 and 1 with a minimum threshold
required to match the coarseness of the 3-digit SIC industry classification. Hoberg
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and Phillips (2016) calculate this minimum threshold to be 0.21.
Hoberg and Phillips (2016) give several examples on the firm-centric textual based
industry classifications they construct. For instance, they describe the eight rivals of
the firm Real Goods Solar in 2008. Some of the core words used to define the product
space around this firm, along with their frequencies of usage, are: electric (9), silicon
(9), electricity (9), roof (9), integrators (8), grid (8), utility (8), film (8), output (8),
semiconductor (8), watt (8), sunlight (8), fuel (7), installations (7), metal (7), cell (7),
incentives (7) etc. They find 9 rivals - Daystar Technologies, Akeena Solar, Evergreen
Solar, Ascent Solar Technologies, Energy Conversion Devices, Sunpower Corp, Power
One, First Solar - which span three SIC3 industries: electronic components [sic3=367]
(6 rivals), electrical industrial apparatus [sic3=362] (1 rival), research and testing svcs
[sic3=873] (1 rival).
2.3.2 Variable Construction: Firm-Pair Level Common Ownership
To measure common ownership at the firm-pair level, I follow previous papers (see,
for example, Freeman (2016)). In specific, I use the following two measures - CO
sum and CO product. CO sum is the fraction of total firm value held by the common
owners of a pair of firms:
P
i(Firm Value Held by Investor i + Rival Value Held by Investor i)
Total Firm Value + Total Rival Value
(2.1)
CO product is the product of the fraction of firm 1’s shares held by its common
owners with firm 2 and the fraction of firm 2’s shares held by its common owners
with firm 1:
P
i(Firm Shares Held by Investor i)
Total Firm Shares
P
i (Rival Shares Held by Investor i)
Total Rival Shares
(2.2)
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Using these measures requires that each firm has a list of rivals for which a common
ownership value between the firm and a particular rival is computed. I use the top
third of the list of rivals in the TNIC industry classification by Hoberg and Phillips
(2016). To be better able to trace rival pairs consistently over time, I require that if
a rival is in the top third of the TNIC list for at least a year, it is included for the
whole duration of available data.
2.3.3 Variable Construction: Firm Level Common Ownership
To calculate levels of concentration due to common ownership, I adopt a measure pro-
posed by Salop and O’Brien (2000). It generalizes the standard Herfindahl-Hirschman
index to take into account common ownership networks between rival firms. The por-
tion of this measure due solely to common ownership is show below:
MHHID =
X
j
X
k 6=j
sjsk
P
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
(2.3)
sj is firm j’s market share,  i,jand  i,j are the control and ownership shares of
investor i in firm j.
2.3.4 Summary statistics
Product market similarity is the pairwise similarity score between two firms in the
sample. This variable is taken from Hoberg and Phillips (2016) and it describes the
product similarity above a minimum required threshold of 21 percent. The mean
value is 0.071 and the standard deviation is 0.058. CO sum and CO product are
the two measures of firm-pair common ownership that are defined above. CO sum
has a mean value of 13 percent suggesting that on average a given pair of firms has
13 percent of its total value held by common owners. The standard deviation of CO
sum is 14 percent. The mean and standard deviation of CO product are 2 percent
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Product Similarity 0.071 0.058 0.029 0.056 0.100
Average Similarity 0.031 0.024 0.018 0.025 0.038
CO sum 0.131 0.141 0.018 0.077 0.208
COT sum 0.022 0.033 0.000 0.005 0.032
COQ sum 0.094 0.100 0.012 0.057 0.148
COD sum 0.015 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.015
CO product 0.039 0.068 0.000 0.006 0.042
COT product 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001
COQ product 0.019 0.034 0.000 0.003 0.019
COD product 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
MB Rival 2.677 18.636 1.055 1.438 2.669
Institutional Ownership Firm 0.410 0.294 0.151 0.366 0.646
Size Firm 5.839 2.105 4.333 5.757 7.203
Market Share Firm 0.014 0.046 0.001 0.002 0.008
This table shows summary statistics at the firm-pair level. Included are the two
common ownership variables - CO sum and CO product and their respective break-
downs by the type of investors according to the classification by Bushee. COQ,
COD, and COT are common ownership by quasi-indexing, dedicated and transient
investors. In addition, the table shows summary statistics for the other controls
used. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available data from 1996
to 2013. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% levels. All
variables are defined in the appendix.
and 5 percent respectively.
Figures 2·1 and 2·2 show the evolution of the CO sum and the CO product variables
over time. They show a clear upward trend in the two common ownership measures.
A big part of this upward trend can be attributed to common ownership due to quasi-
indexing investors. Both measures show that common ownership due to transient and
dedicated investors did not change much over the course of the sample period. There
seems to be an upward trend in both of these measures, but they do not increase
nearly as much as common ownership due to quasi-indexers. An exception to that
is CO due to transient investors during the 2010 to 2012 period, when it increased
substantially in value.
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Figure 2·1: CO sum - Bushee
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This figure shows the evolution of the CO sum variable over time. Also
shown is a breakdown of CO sum by the type of investor responsible for it.
COQ sum, COD sum and COT sum are common ownership due to quasi-
indexing, dedicated and transient investors.
2.3.5 Empirical Specification: Firm-Pair Level Analysis
In my firm-pair analysis I use the following specification (a similar one is used by
Foucault and Fresard (2016)):
Product Market Similarityi,j,t =  CO Measurei,j,t + ✓Firm Controlsi,t
+ Rival Controlsj,t + ↵t +  i + ⌧j + "i,j
(2.4)
I include firm and rival controls - Market-to-Book ratio, size, market shares, and
institutional ownership. These controls are included in an attempt to capture stan-
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Figure 2·2: CO product - Bushee
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This figure shows the evolution of the CO product variable over time. Also
shown is a breakdown of CO sum by the type of investor responsible for it.
COQ product, COD product and COT product are common ownership due
to quasi-indexing, dedicated and transient investors.
dard firm characteristics that might influence firms’ product market behavior. Ad-
ditionally, I include firm and rival fixed e↵ects and double cluster errors at the firm
and rival levels. In robustness checks I also use a specification with pair fixed e↵ects
and pair clustering.
2.3.6 Empirical Specification: Firm Level Analysis
The empirical specification I use in the firm-level analysis on the e↵ects of MHHID
on firm product market strategy is given below:
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Product Similarityi,t =  MHHIDi,t +HHIi,t + ✓Xi,t + ↵t +  i + "i,t (2.5)
The controls included are from Fang et al. (2014) and include standard controls like
R&D spending, ROA, property, plant and equipment, leverage, capital expenditures,
Q, and firm age. ↵t are time fixed e↵ects and  i are firm fixed e↵ects.
2.4 Identification
2.4.1 Identification: Firm-Pair Analysis
Examining the e↵ects of common ownership on firm-pair product similarity poses an
empirical challenge. In specific, there is a possibility that investors simply buy pairs
of firms which are expected to simultaneously introduce a successful new product and
that any relationship between common ownership and product similarity is simply
due to reverse causality. To argue against such a scenario, I use an exogenous schock
to common ownership networks. In September 2003, 25 large mutual fund families
were implicated in illegal trading practices like market timing and late trading. The
investigation into these practices and the ensuing scandal led to significant capital
outflows from the funds involved. Kisin (2010) estimates that the withdrawals lasted
until December 2006 and that the the implicated funds lost 14% of their capital in
2004 and 21% in 2005. Families of funds involved include famous asset managers like
Federated Investors, Franklin Templeton, Deutsche Bank and others.
In constructing the instrument I use, I follow Anton and Polk (2014) who study
stock return co-movement of commonly held firms. In specific, I use the the propor-
tion of total common ownership held by scandal funds in September 2003 to predict
common ownership over the next two years. I define the instrument, Scandal Ratio,
as follows:
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P
iValue of Shares Held by Scandal Fund iP
iValue of Shares Held by Common Owner i
(2.6)
This instrument is likely to be both relevant and to satisfy the exclusion restriction.
A higher Scandal Ratio between a pair of firms in 2003 will likely lead to subsequent
reductions in common ownership at the firm-pair level. This is because shares of sold
firms by a given scandal fund might end up being bought by di↵erent owners, whereas
they were held by the same owner in September 2003. The identifying assumption
is that the Scandal Ratio in 2003 is not related to the product market strategies
firms were planning on implementing in the following two to three years. This is a
reasonable assumption since the scandal was related to fund managers’ policies of
allowing certain clients to trade fund shares in after hours and not to the behavior of
their portfolio firms.
2.4.2 Identification: Firm-Level Analysis
Identifying the e↵ects of concentration due to common ownership on firm product
market strategy at the firm-level poses similar challenges to the ones at the firm-pair
level. Active fund managers might have private information on future firm outcomes.
This can be especially concerning since product market di↵erentiation is associated
with higher firm profitability. Investors might, for example, be willing to hold more
firms from the same industry only when they expect that those firms will di↵erentiate
their products in the future and perform better. As a result, when expected product
di↵erentiation changes, MHHID measures could change due to investors shifting their
holdings towards profitable industries and away from unprofitable ones. This could be
especially true for transient investors. As Bushee (1998) explains transient investors
have high trading sensitivity to current earnings news. As a result, such a concern is
especially valid for them.
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To ameliorate such concerns, I exploit the same identification strategy as the one
I use at the firm-pair level. In specific, I follow Anton et al. (2016) who study the
e↵ect of industry concentration on executive compensation. I define the ratio of
total MHHID held by scandal funds to total MHHID at the time of the scandal and
use it to predict future changes in MHHID. A higher Scandal Ratio means that a
bigger portion of a given firm’s MHHID is susceptible to changes. As scandal funds
experience outflows, other investors are likely to buy the shares these funds sell.
Depending on the other holdings of these new buyers future MHHID could either
increase or decrease. What is certain, however, is that such high scandal ratio firms
are likely to experience bigger changes in future MHHID.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Evidence of Product Market Coordination at the Firm-Pair Level
In this section I examine pair-wise movements of firms in product space and look for
evidence of coordination. The null hypothesis is that there is no such coordination.
As argued previously, theory is ambiguous about the direction of the e↵ect under
the alternative hypothesis. Bridge-building/positive information spillover theories
assert that industry rivals might move closer together in product space to be able
to share information about customer demand or technical know-how and to be able
to collaborate on future projects or bargain more successfully with suppliers. Anti-
competitive theories also predict that firms would move closer together in product
space, but the intent would be to crowd products together and preempt rival entry.
Alternatively, other theories predict that commonly held pairs of firms can benefit
from di↵erentiating their products in order to not directly compete with each other
(Berry and Waldfogel (2001)). Which e↵ect dominates is an empirical question.
Table 2.2 shows the results on the relationship between firm pairwise product
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similarity and the two measures of common ownership defined earlier - CO product
and CO sum. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with CO product, while Columns
3 and 4 use CO sum. The evidence suggests that as common ownership increases,
firms get closer in product space. A one standard deviation increase in CO sum leads
to about 0.005 (0.036*0.14) increase in product similarity. The standard deviation
of product similarity is 0.058. Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in CO
sum leads to about 1/10 of a standard deviation increase in the similarity variable.
The magnitudes are similar with the CO product measure. A one standard deviation
increase in that variable leads to about 0.0037 (0.068*0.055) units increase in product
market similarity.
These results are economically meaningful. They provide evidence against theories
according to which pairs of commonly held firms move futher away in product sapce
in order to not directly compete with each other (Berry and Waldfogel (2001)).
Table 2.3 shows the same results as those in 2.2, but the CO product and CO
sum variables are now broken down according to investor type. COQ, COD and
COT are the common-ownership variables by quasi-indexing, dedicated and transient
investors. Common ownership by all investor types is associated with bigger product
market similarity between pairs of firms. More importantly, the same results holds for
common ownership by quasi-indexing investors, which are responsible for the biggest
part of overall pairwise common ownership links.
2.5.2 Pairwise Product Market Strategy in Concentrated Industries
As explained earlier, both bridge-building/information spillover theories and the anti-
competitive theories predict that increases in common ownership between pairs of
firms will lead to increases in product similarity. However, these two theories have
di↵erent predictions about whether the e↵ect is stronger in more concentrated in-
dustries or not. The anti-competitive theories would predict that the incentive of
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Table 2.2: Common Ownership and Product Market Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Product Product Product Product
Similarity Similarity Similarity Similarity
CO product 0.053 0.055
(0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
CO sum 0.032 0.036
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
Institutional Ownership Rival -0.005 -0.003
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
Institutional Ownership Firm -0.006 -0.004
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
MB Rival 0.000 0.000
(0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤
MB Firm -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Market Share Firm -0.023 -0.024
(0.004)⇤⇤⇤ (0.004)⇤⇤⇤
Market Share Rival -0.027 -0.028
(0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
Size Firm 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)⇤
Size Rival 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)⇤
Observations 2851623 2851623 2851623 2851623
R2 0.613 0.614 0.613 0.613
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm pairwise product similarity on two di↵erent
measures of common ownership - CO product and CO sum. Columns 1 and 2 show
the results with the summation measure, while columns 2 and 4 show the results with
the product measure. The dependent variable is the pairwise similarity score between
two industry rivals from Hoberg and Phillips (2016). It ranges between 0 and 1 with a
minimum threshold of 0.21 required to match the coarseness of the 3-digit SIC industry
classification. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available data during
the period 1996-2013. The definitions of all variables are in the appendix. Standard
errors are two-way clustered at the firm and rival levels. *** denotes 1% significance;
** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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Table 2.3: Common Ownership and Product Market Behavior:
Bushee Split
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Product Product Product Product
Similarity Similarity Similarity Similarity
COQ product 0.073 0.074
(0.004)⇤⇤⇤ (0.004)⇤⇤⇤
COD product 0.284 0.298
(0.031)⇤⇤⇤ (0.030)⇤⇤⇤
COT product 0.257 0.273
(0.019)⇤⇤⇤ (0.019)⇤⇤⇤
COQ sum 0.025 0.029
(0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
COD sum 0.037 0.041
(0.004)⇤⇤⇤ (0.004)⇤⇤⇤
COT sum 0.050 0.055
(0.004)⇤⇤⇤ (0.004)⇤⇤⇤
Observations 2851623 2851623 2851623 2851623
R2 0.613 0.614 0.613 0.613
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm pairwise product similarity
on two di↵erent measures of common ownership - CO product and
CO sum. Columns 1 and 2 show the results with the summation
measure, while columns 2 and 4 show the results with the product
measure. CO product and CO sum are broken down according to
investor type, as defined in Bushee (1998). COQ, COD and COT
are the common-ownership variables by quasi-indexing, dedicated and
transient investors. The dependent variable is the pairwise similarity
score between two industry rivals from Hoberg and Phillips (2016). It
ranges between 0 and 1 with a minimum threshold required to match
the coarseness of the 3-digit SIC industry classification. The sample
consists of all U.S. public firms with available data during the period
1996-2013. The controls variables are defined as before. The defini-
tions of all variables are in the appendix. Standard errors are two-way
clustered at the firm and rival levels. *** denotes 1% significance; **
denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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rivals to close holes in product space and limit competition would be stronger in less
competitive industries, because the oligopolisitc profits that attract entrants would
be higher in such industries. The bridge-building/information spillover theories make
no such predictions.
Table 2.4 shows regressions of firm pairwise product similarity on common own-
ership run on sample splits based on industry concentration. Columns 1 and 2 show
splits based on a profitability HHI index. Columns 3 and 4 shows splits on a revenue
HHI index and Columns 5 and 6 - on an assets HHI index. The results refute the
hypothesis that rivals are more likely to move closer together in product space in more
concentrated industries (high HHI). In fact, they seem to suggest the opposite. The
coe cient on the CO sum variable is somewhat bigger in more competitive industries
(low HHI). These results favor information spillover theories.
2.5.3 Product Market Strategy at the Firm Level
In addition to a↵ecting firm-pair product market interactions, common ownership
has the potential to influence firm-level product market strategy by changing the
overall level of competitiveness of the environment in which a given firm operates. As
argued previously, theory is ambiguous about the direction of the e↵ect. Facing lower
competitive risk and having higher profitability in a less competitive environment
could enable firms to choose a more unique product market strategy (Gu (2016) and
Autor et al. (2016)). But operating in a less competitive environment can also reduce
the incentive to di↵erentiate and (Bloom et al. (2016) and and Hoberg and Phillips
(2016)). Finally, high irreversibility and adjustment costs associated with changing
product market strategy might make firm product market di↵erentiation unresponsive
to changes in competition due to common ownership with rivals.
Table 2.5 shows regressions of firm product market similarity with rivals on the
MHHI variables. Columns 1 and 2 show the baseline results using MHHID due to
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Table 2.4: Common Ownership and Product Market Behavior: HHI splits
HHI Profits HHI Revenues HHI Assets
High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Product Product Product Product Product
Similarity Similarity Similarity Similarity Similarity Similarity
CO sum 0.030 0.041 0.029 0.042 0.029 0.042
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
IO Rival -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
IO Firm -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005
(0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
MB Rival 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000) (0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)
MB Firm 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Share Firm -0.009 -0.089 -0.013 -0.119 -0.014 -0.148
(0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.019)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.023)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.028)⇤⇤⇤
Market Share Rival -0.017 -0.087 -0.019 -0.115 -0.019 -0.110
(0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.008)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
Size Firm 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Size Rival 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)⇤⇤ (0.000) (0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤
Observations 1425517 1425423 1425523 1425424 1425481 1425455
R2 0.620 0.635 0.578 0.649 0.573 0.650
Firm FE, Rival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm pairwise product similarity on common ownership CO sum run on
sample splits based on industry concentration. Columns 1 and 2 show splits based on a profitability HHI
index. Columns 3 and 4 shows splits on a revenue HHI index and Columns 5 and 6 - on an assets HHI index.
The dependent variable is the pairwise similarity score between two industry rivals from Hoberg and Phillips
(2016). It ranges between 0 and 1 with a minimum threshold required to match the coarseness of the 3-digit
SIC industry classification. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available data during the period
1996-2013. The controls variables are defined as before. The definitions of all variables are in the appendix.
Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and rival levels. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5%
significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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all institutional investors. Columns 3 and 4 show the Bushee breakdown of MHHID
according to investor types - quasi-indexer, dedicated and transient. The results show
that an increase in MHHID leads to greater similarity between a firm’s products
and its rivals products. This result seems to be driven by MHHIDQ - the part of
MHHID due to quasi-indexing investors. The standard deviation of MHHIDQ is 0.1.
Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in MHHIDQ leads to about 0.0008 units
increases in Average Similarity. The standard deviation of Average Similarity is about
0.024. This means that the increase in MHHIDQ leads to about 1/30 of a standard
deviation increase in product similarity.
The tables also show that these results stand in stark contrast to the relationship
between HHI and product market similarity. Across all specifications, increases in
HHI lead to decreases in product similarity between a firm and its rivals. One pos-
sibility for this discrepancy is that the institutional investors buy firms before they
are expected to perform better. As a result, MHHIDQ could increase prior to bet-
ter industry performance, which in turn could be caused by overall breakthroughs in
innovation that move all firms together in product space. This could make the OLS
estimates biased.
Table 2.6 shows regressions of firm product market similarity with rivals on the
MHHID variables. The results are meant as a robustness check to those in 2.5. The
MHHID used in 2.6 are based on the SIC industry classifications and on the full list
of the TNIC rivals by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). Columns 1 and 2 show the results
using the SIC-based MHHID. Columns 3 and 4 show the results using the full list
of TNIC rivals. Columns 1 and 3 include no extra controls, while columns 2 and 4
include extra controls. The SIC MHHID results show that there is a negative relation-
ship between MHHID and firm product market similarity with rivals. However, the
coe cient is only significant in the specification with no extra controls. The TNIC
63
Table 2.5: Product Market Similarity and Top Third TNIC MHHI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Average Average Average
Similarity Similarity Similarity Similarity
TNIC MHHID Top Third 0.006 0.006
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third 0.008 0.008
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDD Top Third -0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
TNIC MHHIDT Top Third 0.007 0.005
(0.004)⇤ (0.004)
HHI Top Third -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
Observations 69142 69142 69142 69142
R2 0.738 0.739 0.738 0.739
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm product market similarity with rivals on the
MHHI variables. Product market similarity is defined as the mean pairwise similarity
between a firm and all its rivals. The MHHI variables are constructed at the firm
level and are based on the Text-based Network Industry Classifications by Hoberg and
Phillips (2016). A threshold of 0.5% is imposed when calculating ownership levels.
Columns 1 and 2 show the baseline results using MHHID due to all institutional
investors. Columns 3 and 4 show the Bushee breakdown of MHHI according to
investor types - quasi-indexer, dedicated and transient. Columns 1 and 3 include no
extra controls, while columns 2 and 4 include extra controls. The controls are from
Fang et al. (2014) and are omitted for brevity. The sample consists of all U.S. public
firms with available data during the period 1996-2013. All variables are defined in the
appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The
estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering.
*** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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MHHID results show the opposite relationship and are, therefore, similar to the top
third TNIC MHHID results from Table 2.5.
In summary, the OLS results seem to o↵er a contradictory picture about the re-
lationship between industry concentration due to common ownership (MHHID) and
average product market similarity between a firm and its rivals. First, the sign of
the relationship is positive. In contrast, HHI negatively predicts product market
similarity. Second, the sign is negative and insignificant when the SIC industry clas-
sification is used and positive and significant when the TNIC classifications are used.
One possible explanation for these results is the potential bias with OLS estimates.
2.5.4 Firm-Pair Instrumental Variable Strategy: The 2003 Mutual Fund
Scandal
As explained earlier there is a possibility that investors simply buy pairs of firms
which are expected to simultaneously introduce a successful new product. Therefore,
the results observed in the previous section showing that commonly held firms move
closer together in product space could be due to reverse causality. To rule out such
an explanation, in the this section I use an instrumental variable strategy based on a
large mutual fund scandal that occurred in 2003. As I argued before, this scandal led
to significant capital outflows from the funds involved and represented an exogenous
shock to common ownership networks.
Table 2.7 shows the results of regressions of firm pairwise product similarity on
the instrumented common ownership variable - CO sum. The instrument is the the
proportion of total common ownership held by scandal funds in September 2003. In
addition, following Anton and Polk (2014), I also control for CO sum as of September
2003. I use both a continuous scandal ratio variable and a dummy variable equal
to one for pairs of firms in the top 25% of the distribution of the continuous ratio
variable. Columns 1 and 3 show the first stages and Columns 3 and 4 show the
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Table 2.6: Product Similarity, SIC 400 MHHI and TNIC MHHI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Average Average Average
Similarity Similarity Similarity Similarity
SIC300 MHHID -0.003 -0.001
(0.001)⇤⇤ (0.001)
TNIC MHHID All 0.009 0.009
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
HHI SIC 300 -0.008 -0.006
(0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
Sales HHI -0.009 -0.007
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
Observations 67532 67532 72040 72040
R2 0.256 0.281 0.307 0.319
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm product market similarity with ri-
vals on the MHHI variables. Product market similarity is defined as the
mean pairwise similarity between a firm and all its rivals. Columns 1 and
2 show the results using the SIC-based MHHID. Columns 3 and 4 show
the results using the full list of rivals in the Text-based Network Industry
Classifications by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). A threshold of 0.5% is im-
posed when calculating ownership levels. Columns 1 and 3 include no extra
controls, while columns 2 and 4 include extra controls. The controls are
from Fang et al. (2014) and are omitted for brevity. The sample consists
of all U.S. public firms with available data during the period 1996-2013.
All variables are defined in the appendix. All continuous variables are win-
sorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for
error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1%
significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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respective second stages. In both cases the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is well above
the Stock-Yogo weak instrument test critical values. The results confirm the cross-
sectional evidence from Table 2.2. An increase in the common ownership variable
leads to an increase in firm product market similarity.
The magnitudes of the e↵ects are now substantially larger than these in the cross-
sectional regressions. A one standard deviation increase in CO sum leads to an about
0.028 (0.14*0.2) unit increase in product similarity between a pair of firms. This
is equal to about half of the standard deviation of the product similarity variable.
One potential reason for this change is that the OLS results could be biased down-
ward. If common ownership links proxy for future opportunities, then firms with
higher common ownership could be innovating more and introducing new and di↵er-
ent products. This will in turn make their products less similar to each other and
bias the OLS results towards zero.
Overall, the evidence from the cross-sectional and the IV regressions suggests
that commonly owned firms do indeed move closer together in product space. Fur-
ther, the results suggest that the e↵ect is somewhat stronger in more competitive
industries. This finding goes against predictions of anti-competitive theories, which
assert that coordination between rivals will be highest in less competitive industries,
where oligopolistic profits are higher and the incentives to keep entrants out big-
ger. The findings are consistent with bridge/building information spillover theories
- firms move closer together in product space to be able to share information about
customer demand or technical know-how. Further, the findings are consistent with
He and Huang (2014) who finds that commonly held firms are more likely to form
strategic alliances, joint-ventures or merge with each other. I provide more gran-
ular evidence suggesting that such collaboration e↵orts could operate without the
formation of explicit partnerships.
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Table 2.7: Common Ownership and Product Market Behavior: IV Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CO sum Product CO sum Product
Similarity Similarity
CO sum 0.199 0.164
(0.069)⇤⇤⇤ (0.054)⇤⇤⇤
Scandal Ratio 0.059
(0.006)⇤⇤⇤
High Scandal Ratio 0.006
(0.000)⇤⇤⇤
Stock Return Firm -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001
(0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤
Stock Return Rival -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 32 47
Observations 189386 189386 189386 189386
R2 0.902 0.584 0.902 0.594
Firm, Rival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm pairwise product similarity on the instru-
mented CO sum variable. The instrument is the proportion of common ownership
held by the scandal funds at the time the scandal occurred. Columns 1 and 3 show
the first stages, while columns 2 and 4 show the respective second stages. Column
1 uses a continuous scandal ratio, while Column 3 defines a High Scandal Ratio
dummy equal to one for the pairs in the top 25% of the distribution of the continu-
ous ratio variable. The dependent variable is the pairwise similarity score between
two industry rivals from Hoberg and Phillips (2016). It ranges between 0 and 1 with
a minimum threshold of 0.21 required to match the coarseness of the 3-digit SIC
industry classification. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available
data during the period 1997-2012. All control variables are defined in the appendix.
The controls are the same as in Table 2.2 and are omitted for brevity. Additionally,
I control for CO sum in 2003, the year of the scandal. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. Standard errors are two-way clustered at
the firm and rival levels. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; *
denotes 10% significance.
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2.5.5 Firm-Level Instrumental Variable Strategy: The 2003 Mutual Fund
Scandal
Table 2.8 shows regressions of firm product market similarity with rivals on the in-
strumented concentration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. Columns 1 and 2 show
the first stages of the regression. Columns 3 and 4 show the respective second stages.
While the first stage using the MHHID measure of concentration, does not pass the
standard critical values, the first stage using MHHIDQ does. The Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistic in the first stage for MHHIDQ has a value of 23. The results from the
second stage show that firms become less similar to their rivals as concentration due
to quasi-indexing investors increases. The coe cient is significant at the 10 percent
level. Furthermore, it is economically meaningful. A one standard deviation increase
in MHHIDQ (0.1) leads to about 0.01 units decrease in product similarity with rivals.
This is about 40 percent of the standard deviation of Average Similarity.
The instrumental variable results from Table 2.8 suggest that OLS regressions of
firm product similarity with rivals on MHHID are biased. The OLS results show a
positive relationship between MHHID and product market similarity, while the IV
results show a negative relationship. One potential reason for this could be that
MHHID proxies for future opportunities. This could be the case if investors buy
firms ahead of good performance. As a result, MHHID increases for industries which
are expected to perform better. In turn, better performance could be associated with
industry-wide breakthroughs which make firms’ products more similar to each other.
In Chapter 3, I use a similar identification strategy that improves on the time-
series and cross-sectional coverage of the 2003 mutual fund scandal. The results from
this strategy show that increases in MHHID and MHHIDQ lead to decreases in prod-
uct similarity between a firm and its rivals. Further, the coe cients are similar in
magnitude to the ones in Table 2.8 and are highly statistically significant. Further-
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more, the results from Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 show that increases in MHHID and
MHHIDQ lead to decreases in firm idiosyncratic volatility and mentions of constrain-
ing words and uncertainty words in 10-K filings. 3 These results are consistent with
increases in MHHID and MHHIDQ decreasing firm-level uncertainty and financial
constraints and enabling firms to undertake a more unique product market strategy
by di↵erentiating their products from rivals.
Overall, the instrumental variable results from this section and Chapter 3 are
broadly consistent with Gu (2016) and Autor et al. (2016) and show that market
concentration does a↵ect product market strategy despite the adjustment and irre-
versibility costs associated with changing products.
2.6 Conclusion
In summary, I provide evidence showing that increases in firm pairwise common
ownership leads to an increase in rival coordination. I find that pairs of commonly held
firms move closer together in product space. To measure product market movements,
I use data on firm product market similarity scores based on textual analysis of their
product description sections.
My findings are supportive of bridge-building/information spillover theories which
suggest that commonly held pairs of firms might move closer together in product
space to increase their ability to share information on customer demand for particu-
lar product features, exchange technical know-how on production processes, bargain
more successfully with suppliers or coordinate advertising e↵orts. In addition, the
results provide more granular evidence of such potential coordination e↵orts than the
findings of He and Huang (2014). He and Huang (2014) find that commonly held
3Irvine and Ponti↵ (2009) argue that idiosyncratic volatility is tightly linked to competition.
Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) and Bodnaruk et al. (2015) show that textual based measures of
financial constraints are more accurate at identifying constrained firms than other measures used in
the literature.
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Table 2.8: Product Similarity and The 2003 Mutual Fund Scandal
First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TNIC MHHID TNIC MHHIDQ
Top Third Top Third Similarity Similarity
Ratio Top 50% -0.012 -0.014
(0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Top Third -0.105
(0.057)⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -0.094
(0.048)⇤
TNIC MHHID 2003 0.316 0.282 0.048 0.042
(0.014)⇤⇤⇤ (0.013)⇤⇤⇤ (0.018)⇤⇤⇤ (0.014)⇤⇤⇤
HHI Top Third -0.192 -0.154 -0.031 -0.025
(0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.011)⇤⇤⇤ (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 15.985 23
Observations 6044 6044 6044 6044
R2 0.543 0.520 0.259 0.320
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm product market similarity with rivals on the instrumented
concentration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. The MHHI variables are constructed at the firm
level and are based on the top third of the rivals in the Text-based Network Industry Classifications
by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). As an instrument, I use a dummy for cases where the fraction of
MHHID held by scandal funds in 2003 is above the 50th percentile. A further control is included
for the level of MHHID in 2003: TNIC MHHID 2003. Columns 1 and 2 show the first stages of
the regression. Columns 3 and 4 show the respective second stages. The sample consists of all U.S.
public firms with available data during the period 2004-2005. All control variables are defined in
the appendix. The controls variables are from Fang et al. (2014) and are omitted for brevity. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for
error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5%
significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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firms are more likely to form strategic alliances, joint ventures or merge with each
other. Further, my findings are not supportive of anti-competitive theories of common
ownership, which suggest that the observed increase in product similarity should be
higher in less competitive industries.
Finally, the pairwise findings o↵er more detail on the e↵ects of common own-
ership on rival interactions than existing work which primarily focuses on industry
concentrations measures due to common ownership. Another advantage of looking
at pairwise common ownership to evaluate rival strategic interactions is that such a
measure does not rely on a particular market structure and it o↵ers a less structural
perspective on the e↵ects of common ownership.
Additionally, I examine how changes in the competitive environment a firm faces
a↵ect its product strategy. I find that firms di↵erentiate more from rivals when
market concentration due to common ownership increases. These results are consis-
tent with competition decreasing the uncertainty and financial constraints firms face
and enabling them to adopt a more unique product market strategy by di↵erentiate
themselves from rivals.
In addition to examining the relationship between common ownership and a new
dimension of corporate policy - firm product market strategy - my results connect
with the literature on competition and innovation. One advantage of focusing on the
relationship between competition and product market strategy is that it does not
su↵er from some of the previously identified problems with measures of innovation.
As Akcigit and Liu (2016) and Abrams et al. (2013) argue, innovation has a strategic
revelation element. It is possible that changes in the competitive environment a↵ect
that strategic part of innovation in ways unrelated to actual idea generation.
Chapter 3
Common Ownership and Competition: A
New Identification Strategy
3.1 Introduction
The attention to the role of common ownership of industry rivals for industry com-
petition has grown enormously in the past few years. Antitrust authorities in the in
the U.S. have opened multiple investigations into the anti-competitive e↵ects of com-
mon ownership. For example, on March 9, 2016 William J. Baer, former Assistant
Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, confirmed
before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust that the Department of Jus-
tice is ”looking at” the ”common ownership issue . . . in more than one industry”.
Similarly, in response to an executive order issued by President Obama on April 15,
2016 and entitled ”Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and
Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy”, a brief by the
White House Council of Economic Advisers listed common ownership as a poten-
tial contributor to decreased competition. 1 As a result, understanding the e↵ects
of concentration based on common ownership on firm behavior is of crucial policy
importance.
In this chapter, I propose a new identification strategy, which can be used to
study the e↵ects of industry concentration due to common ownership. My strategy
1https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_
cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf
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has substantially better cross-section and time-series coverage relative to previously
used instruments. Specifically, I first identify mutual funds that are exposed to under-
performing industries and are likely to face outflows. Then, I calculate the proportion
of the MHHID (modified Herfindahl-Hirschman index or concentration due to com-
mon ownership) such exposed funds are responsible for in una↵ected industries. I
show that this ratio strongly predicts future changes in MHHID. This result can be
explained by the fact that industries with higher proportion of MHHID held by ex-
posed funds are likely to face bigger future changes in MHHID as exposed funds sell
their holdings. The direction of the e↵ect cannot be predicted ex-ante as it depends
on the other holdings of the buyers.
Using this new instrument, I revisit the results from the first chapter on cash
holdings and confirm that higher MHHI delta leads to lower cash holdings, consistent
with the idea that firms facing lower competition need to maintain lower cash bu↵ers.
I complement these findings in several important ways. I show that increases in MH-
HID lead to decreases in the number of constraining and uncertainty related words
in firms’ 10-K filings. This highlights a potential mechanism behind the reduction in
cash holdings - a reduction in financial constraints and uncertainty reduces the need
for firms to hold high precautinary cash balances.This might be because lower com-
petition reduces future project uncertainty and makes external funds more accessible.
2 I further confirm the result on financial constraints using the financial constraint
measures by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). The authors specifically analyze the
Liquidity and Capitalization Resource Subsection of the Management Discussion and
Analysis (MD&A) section of firms’ 10-K filings. I find that equity and private security
placement constraints decrease as MHHID increases.
Finally, I show that the negative relationship between cash balances and MHHID
2Bodnaruk et al. (2015) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) show that textual based measures of
financial constraints perform well at predicting which firms are constrained (in contrast to standard
measures of financial constraints).
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is driven by financially constrained firms. This agrees with findings in Morellec et al.
(2015) and is consistent with the idea that the relationship between competition and
cash holdings is driven by precautionary motives. In specific, when competition de-
creases firms do not need to hold as much extra cash, because they are less financially
constrained and they can obtain external funds instead. These results should not,
however, be viewed as a definite test of precautionary theories. The absence of a result
would have not been an argument against such theories. This is because, as Almeida
et al. (2011) find, constrained firms use up their cash holdings to absorb shocks. In
other words, more constrained firms might not be able to make an adjustment to their
cash balances when competition decreases, because they might be using these cash
holdings for other purposes. As a result, the negative relationship between MHHID
and cash holdings would be more pronounced for financially constrained firms only
if those firms are actually able to make an adjustment towards their optimal level of
cash.
I further revisit the results from Chapter 2 and show that firms which face lower
competition due to common ownership di↵erentiate their products more from rivals.
Taken together with the results showing that increases in MHHID lead to decreases
in usage of uncertain and constraining words in 10-K filings, these findings can be
interpreted in light of the evidence in Gu (2016) and Autor et al. (2016). As com-
petition due to common ownership decreases firms face less uncertainty and are less
constrained. This enables them to adopt a more risky product market strategy and
di↵erentiate themselves from rivals. Furthermore, I find that this result is not driven
by high-tech innovative industries (defined as in Brown and Petersen (2009)). This
suggests that product market strategy is an independent margin that firms adjust
irrespective of their R&D activities.
I also replicate the findings from Chapter 2 on firm pairwise product market
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movements. I find that commonly held pairs of firms move closer together in product
space. This finding is consistent with results in He and Huang (2014). The authors
find that pairs of commonly held industry rivals are more likely to form alliances,
joint-ventures or undertake within-industry acquisitions. The results I present provide
more granular evidence consistent with He and Huang (2014). Potential benefits firms
could derive from moving closer together in product space include sharing information
on customer demand for particular product features (Reichardt (1962)), exchanging
technical know-how on production processes and improvements to existing products,
coordinating marketing spending and jointly increasing new product awareness and
adoption by customers.
Overall, I build on the literature on mutual fund outflows and stock mispricing to
construct an instrument for MHHI delta. This literature generally follows Coval and
Sta↵ord (2007) , who examine institutional price pressure in equity markets. The
authors look at funds which experience outflows and exploit their tendency to de-
crease their current positions. They show selling by such funds creates price pressure
on stocks held by such funds. One potential concern with such an approach is that
rational investors might anticipate bad fund performance and withdraw their money
from the exposed funds. One particular approach to alleviate such concerns is pro-
posed by Harald and Lai (2013). The authors use mutual fund exposure to losses in
their financial holdings during the crisis of 2007-2008 to examine the e↵ects of the
same mutual funds’ holdings in non-financial stocks. Parise (2016) further general-
izes this approach and uses outflows from funds exposed to distressed industries to
examine the e↵ects of mispricing in the non-distressed holdings of such funds.
I further build on the literature on common ownership and the part of it which
focuses on firm product market outcomes. Azar (2012) and He and Huang (2014) find
a positive e↵ect of common ownership of same-industry rivals on product market per-
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formance. They argue that their results are consistent with increased product market
coordination by commonly held rivals. Azar et al. (2015) and Azar et al. (2016) argue
that the anti-competitive e↵ects of common ownership manifest themselves through
pricing behavior. They examine market concentration in the airline and banking in-
dustries respectively and find a positive impact on prices in routes/areas with higher
common ownership. My contribution relative to these earlier papers lies in examining
the e↵ects of common ownership for a broad set of industries. In this respect, this
paper is most similar to He and Huang (2014). One di↵erence with He and Huang
(2014) is that I focus on a firm-level measure of concentration due to common owner-
ship, while they focus on a binary measure of common ownership between a firm and
its rivals. I further exploit an identification strategy that has better cross-sectional
and time-series coverage. In contrast, they use a series of institutional mergers, which
a↵ect about 1000 firms in total. Finally, I examine firm financial policy and product
market strategy - two questions that they leave open.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data and the
identification strategy. Section 3 presents the instrumental variable results for cash
holdings, uncertainty, financial constraints and product market strategy. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Data
I use data on mutual funds from Thomson Reuters and CRSP Mutual Funds. I link
the two using the MFLINKS tables. The holdings data is from Thomson Reuters,
while data on the type of funds is from CRSP Mutual Funds. Following the literature,
I exclude purely index, international, municipal bond, fixed income and balanced
funds. The funds remaining are domestic equity funds.
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To construct the investor ownership variables in this paper, I use the Thomson-
Reuters 13F database. All organizations with portfolios of more than $100 million
are required by the SEC to report quarterly holdings. I restrict attention to blocks
of ownership that are greater or equal to 0.5%. The results are similar if I include
all ownership blocks. I calculate the MHHI variables and other institutional holding
variables as an average over their quarterly values for the respective year of inter-
est. As explained earlier, the 13-F data does not include ownership by individuals
and small institutions. This is likely going to introduce noise in measuring common
ownership and bias the analysis against finding a result.
The reason for using two di↵erent ownership datasets to construct the instrument
and the concentration variables is based on the various advantages and disadvantages
of the two sources of data. The mutual fund data includes only the holdings of mutual
funds. As a result, it omits holdings by other institutional investors. However, this
data does not aggregate holdings across di↵erent funds in a family. As a result, it is
easier to trace which particular funds are subject to outflows. In contrast, the 13F
database is more complete in terms of the types of institutions it includes. However,
the holdings of all funds within a family are aggregated and this makes it harder to
predict which funds are exposed to outflows. This is because a particular fund within
the family might not be su↵ering outflows, but its holdings would be lumped together
with those of other funds within the same family.
As in the previous chapters, accounting data on public firms comes from COM-
PUSTAT and CRSP. The sample is restricted from 1997 to 2012 so that I can take
advantage of recent industry classifications that start in 1996 (Hoberg and Phillips
(2016)). In addition to the standard SIC industry classification, I also use data from
Hoberg and Phillips (2016). They use product descriptions from 10-K filings of all
public firms to define local industries around each firm.
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3.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 shows yearly summary statistics for the mutual funds used in constructing
the fraction of MHHI due to funds exposed to outflows. The number of funds in a
given year fluctuates between about 1500 and 2600. TNA, flows and returns are first
averaged over the four quarters of a given year and then they are averaged over all
funds. Total Net Assets of the average fund range from about 330 to 700 million.
Average fund flows are between -0.3 percent and 15 percent. The negative flows are
observed in 2009 and 2010, consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that retail
investors pulled money out of mutual funds in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
Finally, returns go from -16 percent to about 12 percent.
Table 3.2 shows accounting information of firms included in the sample. Addition-
ally, it includes summary statistics for the competition measures used. The values
of the variables are largely consistent with the previous literature and with those re-
ported in the first chapter. The only di↵erence from Chapter 1 is that the sample here
ranges from 1997 to 2012. This means that it starts one year later than sample used
in Chapter 1. The reason for this is that the identification strategy I use attempts
to predict MHHI with lagged values of the fraction of MHHI held by funds exposed
to outflows. For this reason, I lose one year of observations at the beginning. The
sample is further limited to 2012, because of the link between the CRSP mutual fund
data and the Thomson Reuters data ends in 2012.
3.2.3 A New Instrumental Variable Strategy
To construct an instrument for MHHI, I adapt the methodology from the literature
on fund outflows to the case of common ownership. In particular, I most closley build
on Parise (2016), whose approach has a number of advantages to other papers in the
literature (see, for example, Harald and Lai (2013) and Coval and Sta↵ord (2007)).
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Table 3.1: Fund Summary Statistics
Year Number of Funds TNA Flows Returns
1997 1557 611 0.148 0.076
1998 1808 650 0.093 0.073
1999 2012 702 0.107 0.109
2000 2241 695 0.116 0.043
2001 2428 427 0.149 -0.066
2002 2502 332 0.109 -0.086
2003 2461 356 0.121 0.068
2004 2408 461 0.060 0.061
2005 2483 512 0.092 0.031
2006 2356 559 0.052 0.042
2007 2482 567 0.041 0.024
2008 2630 349 0.091 -0.160
2009 2334 332 -0.009 0.127
2010 2167 388 -0.003 0.075
2011 2023 468 0.031 -0.013
2012 1782 486 0.012 0.060
This table reports yearly summary statistics for the mu-
tual funds used in the sample. Only domestic equity
funds are considered. The TNA (total net assets) are
in millions of dollars. TNA, flows and returns are first
averaged over the four quarters of a given year and then
they are averaged over all funds.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 Q3
Cash 0.200 0.233 0.027 0.102 0.296
TNIC MHHID Top Third 0.203 0.114 0.116 0.196 0.280
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third 0.155 0.100 0.079 0.140 0.215
TNIC MHHIDD Top Third 0.019 0.025 0.003 0.012 0.025
TNIC MHHIDT Top Third 0.027 0.036 0.005 0.014 0.031
TNIC MHHID Top Third 0.239 0.144 0.140 0.228 0.317
TNIC MHHID All 0.267 0.124 0.176 0.261 0.350
SIC300 MHHID 0.246 0.120 0.159 0.240 0.331
HHI Top Third 0.309 0.208 0.151 0.255 0.412
Institutional Ownership 0.502 0.307 0.222 0.519 0.768
MB 2.133 2.743 1.105 1.470 2.253
Firm Size 5.838 2.041 4.360 5.780 7.235
Cash Flow -0.022 0.434 -0.001 0.062 0.106
Net Working Capital 0.041 0.301 -0.050 0.036 0.161
Capex 0.081 0.090 0.023 0.051 0.102
Book Leverage 0.236 0.273 0.023 0.188 0.354
Dividend Dummy 0.304 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000
RD 0.887 0.317 1.000 1.000 1.000
Industry Sigma Top Third 0.116 0.137 0.035 0.064 0.128
Industry Sigma 0.130 0.147 0.042 0.074 0.146
The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available data from 1997 to 2012.
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% levels. All variables
are defined in the appendix.
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I first identify distressed industries. The particular industry definition I use is the
3 digits of the SIC code. I calculate the quarterly mean industry performance over
the period 1997-2012 for all industries. I use ROA as a measure of performance.
In specific, I use the earnings per share measure from COMPUSTAT multiplied by
the number of shares and divided by previous quarter’s assets. Then, I calculate
the di↵erence between current performance and expected industry performance and
identify distressed industry-quarters as those in the bottom 10 percent of this measure.
ROADiff = ROA  E[ROA] (3.1)
The next step requires defining funds exposed to distressed industries. I use lagged
stock weights multiplied by the negative of returns of distressed stocks to calculate
fund j’s exposure in a given quarter t.
Exposurej,t =
distressedX
i
wi,t 1( Returni,t) (3.2)
The summation explicitly excludes non-distressed stocks. I then define exposed
funds as those which are in the bottom 10 percent of the exposure variable.
To be able to provide evidence showing that the Exposure variable I defined above
is indeed negatively a↵ecting fund flows and, in turn, forcing funds to sell some of
their holdings, I need a definition of fund flows. It is given below:
Flowj,t =
TNAj,t   (1 + rt)TNAj,t 1
TNAj,t 1
(3.3)
TNA are total net assets under management of fund j in quarter t and rt are
quarterly fund returns.
In the final step, I use a Bartik-style instrument in which I calculate MHHID held
by exposed funds in each quarter. The sum in the numerator is over all exposed
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funds, while the sum in the denominator is over all funds.
MHHIDexposed =
X
j
X
k 6=j
sjsk
Pexposed
i  i,j i,kP
i  i,j i,j
(3.4)
I then average this measure over a given year and calculate the fraction of actual
MHHID that this exposed MHHID represents.
Ratiot =
MHHIDexposedt 1
MHHIDt 1
(3.5)
Finally, I use the resulting ratio to predict the changes in MHHID in the following
year. The prediction is that funds exposed to distressed industries will sell their non-
exposed holdings as well. Whenever a higher fraction of MHHID is held by exposed
funds, I expect to observe bigger changes in next year’s MHHID.
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Fund Flows
Table 3.3 presents the results of regressions of fund flows on the Exposure variable
and on a dummy for high exposure. As explained earlier, I use a 10 percent cut-
o↵ to define high exposure. This means that in each year the funds in the highest
decile of exposure are included in the Top 10 Percent Exposure dummy. Columns 1
and 3 include the two exposure variables - continuous Exposure and the dummy Top
10 Percent Exposure and no additional controls. Columns 2 and 4 include the same
exposure variables and the full set of controls - Fund Assets, Expense Ratio, Turnover
Ratio, Lagged Flows and Lagged Returns. The results from all specifications tell a
consistent story. The exposure variables strongly and negatively predict fund flows.
A one standard deviation increase in Exposure leads to about 1.2 percent increase in
outflows, while the Top 10 Percent Exposure variable predicts a 1.7 percent increase
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in outflows. This represents about 1/20 of the standard deviation of flow variable
and about 1/2 of its mean. In other words, the magnitudes of fund flows predicted
by the exposure variables are economically meaningful.
3.3.2 Cash Holdings: IV results
Table 3.4 presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented concentration
measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. The fraction of MHHI held by exposed funds in
the previous year is used as an instrument. A dummy is defined when the ratio takes
values in the top 10 percent of its distribution: Ratio Top 10 Percent. I further control
for the lagged MHHI ( TNIC MHHID Lagged. Columns 1 and 3 show the first stages
of the regression. Columns 2 and 4 show the respective second stages. Additional
controls as in Bates et al. (2013) are included and omitted for brevity.
Table 3.5 presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented concen-
tration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. The fraction of MHHI held by exposed
funds in the previous year is used as an instrument. A dummy is defined when the
ratio takes values in the top 10 percent of its distribution: Ratio Top 10 Percent. I
further control for the lagged MHHI ( TNIC MHHID Lagged. Columns 1 and 3 show
the first stages of the regression. Columns 2 and 4 show the respective second stages.
Additional controls as in Bates et al. (2013) are included and omitted for brevity.
3.3.3 Uncertainty and Financial Constraints: IV results
Table 3.6 shows regressions of the frequency of uncertainty related words in firms’ 10-
K filings on the instrumented concentration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. The
fraction of MHHI held by exposed funds in the previous year is used as an instrument.
in particular, I define a dummy when the ratio takes values in the top 10 percent of
its distribution: Ratio Top 10 Percent. I further control for the lagged MHHI ( TNIC
MHHID Lagged. Columns 1 and 3 show the first stages of the regression. Columns
83
Table 3.3: Exposed Funds and Fund Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flows Flows Flows Flows
Exposure -0.011 -0.012
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
Top 10 Percent Exposure -0.015 -0.017
(0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
Fund Assets -0.014 -0.014
(0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
Expense Ratio -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Turnover Ratio -0.009 -0.009
(0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
Lagged Flows 0.051 0.050
(0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤
Lagged Returns 0.004 0.004
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
Observations 102656 102656 102656 102656
R2 0.090 0.113 0.090 0.112
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents the results of regressions of fund flows on the Exposure vari-
able and on a dummy for high exposure (Top 10 Percent Exposure). Columns 1
and 3 include the exposure variables and no additional controls. Columns 2 and
4 include the full set of controls. The data is quarterly. The sample consists of all
domestic equity mutual funds with available data during the period 1997-2012.
All control variables are defined in the appendix. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for error
heteroskedasticity and within-fund error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance;
** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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Table 3.4: Cash Holdings and Top Third MHHI: IV Results
TNIC MHHID Cash TNIC MHHIDQ Cash
Top Third Top Third
TNIC MHHID Top Third -1.356
(0.517)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -0.954
(0.331)⇤⇤⇤
Ratio Top 10 Percent -0.006 -0.008
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Lagged 0.475 0.655 0.395 0.387
(0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.246)⇤⇤⇤ (0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.131)⇤⇤⇤
HHI Top Third -0.037 -0.061 -0.025 -0.034
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.019)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.008)⇤⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 25 63
Observations 39403 39403 39403 39403
R2 0.585 0.408 0.541 0.518
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented concentration measures
- MHHID and MHHIDQ. The fraction of MHHI held by exposed funds in the previous year is
used as an instrument. A dummy is defined when the ratio takes values in the top 10 percent of
its distribution: Ratio Top 10 Percent. I further control for the lagged MHHI ( TNIC MHHID
Lagged. Columns 1 and 3 show the first stages of the regression. Columns 2 and 4 show the
respective second stages. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available data during
the period 1997-2012. All control variables are defined in the appendix. The controls variables
are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and
within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes
10% significance.
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Table 3.5: Cash Holdings and Top Third MHHI: IV Results
TNIC MHHID Cash TNIC MHHIDQ Cash
Top Third Top Third
TNIC MHHID Top Third -1.934
(0.536)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -1.203
(0.279)⇤⇤⇤
Ratio Top 25 Percent -0.005 -0.008
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Lagged 0.475 0.929 0.396 0.486
(0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.255)⇤⇤⇤ (0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.111)⇤⇤⇤
HHI Top Third -0.162 -0.358 -0.108 -0.175
(0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.087)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.032)⇤⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 30 90
Observations 39403 39403 39403 39403
R2 0.585 0.219 0.541 0.475
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented concentration measures
- MHHID and MHHIDQ. The MHHID variables are constructed at the firm level and are based
on the Top Third of the rivals of a given firm in the Text-based Network Industry Classifications
by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). The fraction of MHHI held by exposed funds in the previous year
is used as an instrument. A dummy is defined when the ratio takes values in the top 25 percent
of its distribution: Ratio Top 25 Percent. I further control for the lagged MHHI ( TNIC MHHID
Lagged. Columns 1 and 3 show the first stages of the regression. Columns 2 and 4 show the
respective second stages. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available data during
the period 1997-2012. All control variables are defined in the appendix. The controls variables
are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and
within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes
10% significance.
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2 and 4 show the respective second stages. The second stage regressions show that
increases in MHHID and the respective decreases in competition lead to a decrease
in the frequency of uncertainty related words in firms’ 10-K filings.
Table 3.7 shows regressions of the frequency of constraining related words used in
firms’ 10-K filings on the instrumented concentration measures - MHHID and MH-
HIDQ. The constraint variables are taken from Bodnaruk et al. (2015). As before, the
fraction of MHHI held by exposed funds in the previous year is used as an instrument.
In particular, I define a dummy when the ratio takes values in the top 10 percent of
its distribution: Ratio Top 10 Percent. I further control for the lagged MHHI ( TNIC
MHHID Lagged. Columns 1 and 3 show the first stages of the regression. Columns
2 and 4 show the respective second stages. The second stage regressions show that
increases in MHHID and the respective decreases in competition lead to a decrease
in the frequency of constraining words in firms’ 10-K filings.
I further show results on how competition a↵ects financial constraints using the
variables constructed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). The authors use textual
analysis of the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of firms’ 10-
K filings to calculate a score of how constrained firms are. They first find firms
that explicitly say they delay investment due to liquidity issues in the Liquidity and
Capitalization Resource Subsection of the MD&A section. Then then calculate cosine
similarity between firms which say they are constrained and all other firms. This gives
them a continuous measure of constraints for a large number of firms. Finally, Hoberg
and Maksimovic (2015) define in a similar way measures which determine which firms
are attempting to raise equity, debt or do a private placement of securities. This
enables them to obtain continuous scores on firms facing equity constraints, debt
constraints and private placement constraints.
Table 3.8 shows regression of firm financial constraints taken from Hoberg and
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Table 3.6: Uncertainty and Top Third MHHI: IV Results
TNIC MHHID Percent TNIC MHHIDQ Percent
Top Third Uncertain Words Top Third Uncertain Words
TNIC MHHID Top Third -0.027
(0.009)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -0.020
(0.006)⇤⇤⇤
Ratio Top 10 Percent -0.006 -0.008
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Lagged 0.473 0.012 0.394 0.007
(0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.004)⇤⇤⇤ (0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤
HHI Top Third -0.038 -0.001 -0.025 -0.001
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 23 54
Observations 33722 33722 33722 33722
R2 0.585 -0.057 0.541 0.165
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented concentration measures - MHHID and
MHHIDQ. The MHHI variables are constructed at the firm level and are based on the Top Third of the rivals
of a given firm in the Text-based Network Industry Classifications by Hoberg and Phillips (2016). The fraction
of MHHI held by exposed funds in the previous year is used as an instrument. A dummy is defined when the
ratio takes values in the top 25 percent of its distribution: Ratio Top 25 Percent. I further control for the lagged
MHHI ( TNIC MHHID Lagged. Columns 1 and 3 show the first stages of the regression. Columns 2 and 4 show
the respective second stages. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available data during the period
1997-2012. All control variables are defined in the appendix. The controls variables are from Bates et al. (2013)
and are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations
are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes
5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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Table 3.7: Contraints and Top Third MHHI: IV Results
TNIC MHHID Percent TNIC MHHIDQ Percent
Top Third Constrained Top Third Constrained
TNIC MHHID Top Third -0.009
(0.004)⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -0.007
(0.003)⇤⇤
Ratio Top 10 Percent -0.006 -0.008
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Lagged 0.473 0.004 0.394 0.002
(0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤ (0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)
HHI Top Third -0.038 -0.000 -0.025 -0.000
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 23 54
Observations 33722 33722 33722 33722
R2 0.585 0.109 0.541 0.197
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented concentration measures -
MHHID and MHHIDQ. The MHHI variables are constructed at the firm level and are based on the
Top Third of the rivals of a given firm in the Text-based Network Industry Classifications by Hoberg
and Phillips (2016). The fraction of MHHI held by exposed funds in the previous year is used as an
instrument. A dummy is defined when the ratio takes values in the top 25 percent of its distribution:
Ratio Top 25 Percent. I further control for the lagged MHHI ( TNIC MHHID Lagged. Columns 1 and 3
show the first stages of the regression. Columns 2 and 4 show the respective second stages. The sample
consists of all U.S. public firms with available data during the period 1997-2012. All control variables
are defined in the appendix. The controls variables are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for
brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are
adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; **
denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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Maksimovic (2015) on the instrumented concentration variable -MHHIDQ. As before,
the fraction of MHHID held by exposed funds in the previous year is used as an
instrument. A dummy is defined when the ratio takes values in the top 10 percent
of its distribution. Columns 1 and 2 show the second stages when using the equity
constraint variable from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), while Columns 3 and 4 use
the debt and the private placement constraint variables. The results indicate that
increases in concentration due to common ownership decrease the financial constraints
firms face. This holds for equity constraints and for private placement constraints,
but does not seem to hold for debt constraints. The magnitudes are economically
meaningful - a one standard deviation increase in MHHIDQ leads to about 66 percent
of a standard deviation decrease in equity constraints and to about half a standard
deviation decrease in private securities constraints. These results seem in line with
the hypothesis that a decrease in concentration due to common ownership reduces
financial constraints. As Table 3.8 shows the result seems to be observed also for the
HHI variable. Furthermore, it is consistent with findings in Valta (2012) who shows
that competition increases the cost of debt for firms.
3.3.4 Cash Holdings and Financial Constraints based on Hoberg and
Maksimovic (2015)
Table 3.9 uses the same constraint variables as the ones in Table 3.8 and evaluates the
hypothesis that more constrained firms are more likely to adjust their cash holdings.
Morellec et al. (2015) shows theoretically and empirically that financially constrained
firms increase their cash holdings by more when competition increases. This is because
such firms are constrained in raising external funds and, as a result, need to hold
higher cash bu↵ers. Correspondingly, this line of reasoning would imply that when
competition decreases such firms would decrease their cash holdings by more.
Table 3.9 shows regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented concen-
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Table 3.8: Constraints and Top Third MHHI: IV Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
equitydelaycon equitydelaycon debtdelaycon privdelaycon
TNIC MHHID -0.658
(0.312)⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ -0.464 0.016 -0.464
(0.204)⇤⇤ (0.122) (0.176)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID L 0.165 0.295 -0.022 0.177
(0.080)⇤⇤ (0.148)⇤⇤ (0.048) (0.069)⇤⇤
HHI -0.014 -0.027 0.000 -0.014
(0.005)⇤⇤⇤ (0.011)⇤⇤ (0.003) (0.004)⇤⇤⇤
K.P. F-statistic 47 19 47 47
Observations 32523 32523 32523 32523
R2 0.141 -0.027 0.201 0.176
Ind./Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm financial constraints on the instrumented concen-
tration measure MHHIDQ. The fraction of MHHID held by exposed funds in the previous
year is used as an instrument. A dummy is defined when the ratio takes values in the
top 10 percent of its distribution. I further control for the lagged MHHID (TNIC MHHID
L). Columns 1 and 2 show the second stages when using the equity constraint variable
from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), while Columns 3 and 4 use the debt and the private
placement constraint variables. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available
data during the period 1997-2012. All control variables are defined in the appendix. The
controls variables are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for
error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; **
denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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tration measure MHHIDQ. Columns 1 and 2 show the second stages when using
the equity constraint variable from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), while Columns
3 and 4 use the overall constraint variable. Columns 1 and 3 show the results for
constrained firms, while Columns 2 and 4 show the results for non-constrained ones.
The results show that the negative e↵ect of competition on firm cash holdings seem
to be driven by financially constrained firms. This is in agreement with the findings
in Morellec et al. (2015). These results, however, should not be interpreted as a
definite test of precationary theories of cash holdings. For example, Almeida et al.
(2011) find that firms with large amount of expiring debt during the financial crisis
used their cash holdings to absorb the shock. In other words, more constrained firms
might not be able to make an adjustment to their cash balances when competition
decreases. Therefore, we would observe a given pattern for financially constrained
firms depending on which e↵ect dominates.
3.3.5 Product Strategy at the Firm-Pair Level: IV results
Table 3.10 shows regressions of firm pairwise product similarity on the instrumented
CO sum variable. As argued before, the null hypothesis is that there is no coordination
between pairs of firms. Theory is, however, ambiguous about the direction of the e↵ect
under the alternative hypothesis. Positive spillover theories assert that industry rivals
might move closer together in product space to be able to share information about
customer demand or technical know-how. Alternatively, some theories predict that
commonly held pairs of firms can benefit from di↵erentiating their products in order to
not directly compete with each other (Berry and Waldfogel (2001)). The results from
3.10 seem to suggest that firms move closer together in product space. This means
that the benefits of doing so outweigh the product cannibalization e↵ects discussed
above.
Columns 1 and 3 show the first stages, while columns 2 and 4 show the respective
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Table 3.9: Cash Holdings and Top Third MHHI: Splits on Constraints
C Equity NC Equity C Overall NC Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Cash Cash Cash
TNIC MHHIDQ -1.633 -0.329 -1.880 -0.321
(0.593)⇤⇤⇤ (0.346) (0.651)⇤⇤⇤ (0.344)
TNIC MHHID L 0.648 0.151 0.745 0.148
(0.241)⇤⇤⇤ (0.135) (0.262)⇤⇤⇤ (0.135)
HHI Top Third -0.046 -0.018 -0.052 -0.018
(0.013)⇤⇤⇤ (0.009)⇤ (0.014)⇤⇤⇤ (0.009)⇤
K.P. F-statistic 28 40 23 44
Observations 16370 16355 16360 16369
R2 0.475 0.488 0.426 0.508
Ind./Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm cash holdings on the instrumented
concentration measure MHHIDQ. The fraction of MHHID held by exposed
funds in the previous year is used as an instrument. A dummy is defined
when the ratio takes values in the top 25 percent of its distribution. I further
control for the lagged MHHID (TNIC MHHID L). Columns 1 and 2 show
the second stages when using the equity constraint variable from Hoberg and
Maksimovic (2015), while Columns 3 and 4 use the overall constraint vari-
able. Columns 1 and 3 show the results for constrained firms, while Columns
2 and 4 show the results for non-constrained ones. The sample consists of all
U.S. public firms with available data during the period 1997-2012. All con-
trol variables are defined in the appendix. The controls variables are from
Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for
error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1%
significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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second stages. Column 1 uses a continuous scandal ratio, while Column 3 defines a
Dummy equal to one for the pairs in the top 10% of the distribution of the continuous
ratio variable. In both cases the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is well above the Stock-
Yogo weak instrument test critical values. The magnitude of the coe cients suggests
that a one standard deviation increase in CO sum leads to about one-fourth of a
standard deviation increase in the pairwise product similarity variable.
3.3.6 Product Strategy at the Firm Level: IV results
Table 3.11 shows regressions of firm product market similarity with rivals on the in-
strumented concentration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. The fraction of MHHID
held by exposed funds in the previous year is used as an instrument. In particular, I
define a dummy when the ratio takes values in the top 10 percent of its distribution:
Ratio Top 10 Percent. I further control for the lagged MHHI ( TNIC MHHID Lagged.
Columns 1 and 3 show the first stages of the regression. Columns 2 and 4 show the
respective second stages. The second stage regressions show that increases in MH-
HID and the respective decreases in competition lead to a decrease in the product
similarity of a given firm with its rivals.
Table 3.12 shows regressions of firm product market similarity with rivals on the
instrumented concentration measure MHHIDQ. The results are presented for RD-
intensive and non-RD intensive industries. As before, the fraction of MHHID held by
exposed funds in the previous year is used as an instrument. In particular, I define
a dummy when the ratio takes values in the top 10 percent of its distribution: Ratio
Top 10 Percent. I further control for the lagged MHHI (TNIC MHHID Lagged).
Columns 1 and 3 show the first stages of the regression for RD and non-RD intensive
industries. Columns 2 and 4 show the respective second stages. The second stage
regressions show that increases in MHHID and the respective decreases in competition
lead to a decrease in the product similarity of a given firm with its rivals. The e↵ect
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Table 3.10: Common Ownership and Pairwise Product Similarity:
IV Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CO sum Product CO sum Product
Similarity Similarity
CO sum 0.066 0.102
(0.011)⇤⇤⇤ (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
Ratio 3.537
(0.097)⇤⇤⇤
Dummy Ratio 0.034
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤
Stock Return Firm -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000) (0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤
Stock Return Rival -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000) (0.000)⇤⇤⇤ (0.000)⇤
K. P. F-statistic 1340 1931
Observations 1535356 1535356 1535356 1535356
R2 0.822 0.581 0.826 0.577
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm pairwise product similarity on the
instrumented CO sum variable. The instrument is the proportion of com-
mon ownership held by the exposed funds. Columns 1 and 3 show the first
stages, while columns 2 and 4 show the respective second stages. Column 1
uses a continuous scandal ratio, while Column 3 defines a Dummy equal to
one for the pairs in the top 10% of the distribution of the continuous ratio
variable. The dependent variable is the pairwise similarity score between
two industry rivals from Hoberg and Phillips (2016). It ranges between 0
and 1 with a minimum threshold of 0.21 required to match the coarseness
of the 3-digit SIC industry classification. The sample consists of all U.S.
public firms with available data during the period 1997-2012. All control
variables are defined in the appendix. The controls are the same as in Ta-
ble 2.2 and are omitted for brevity. Additionally, I control for COsumt 1,
the lagged COsum variable. All continuous variables are winsorized at the
1% and the 99% level. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm
and rival levels. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; *
denotes 10% significance.
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Table 3.11: Product Similarity and Top Third MHHI: IV Results
First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TNIC MHHID Similarity TNIC MHHIDQ Similarity
Top Third Top Third
TNIC MHHID Top Third -0.211
(0.055)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -0.154
(0.035)⇤⇤⇤
Ratio Top 10 Percent -0.006 -0.009
(0.001)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Lagged 0.462 0.117 0.383 0.079
(0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.026)⇤⇤⇤ (0.006)⇤⇤⇤ (0.013)⇤⇤⇤
HHI Top Third -0.166 -0.047 -0.112 -0.029
(0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.009)⇤⇤⇤ (0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.004)⇤⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 33 77
Observations 44843 44843 44843 44843
R2 0.582 -0.253 0.539 0.110
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm product market similarity with rivals on the instrumented concen-
tration measures - MHHID and MHHIDQ. The MHHI variables are constructed at the firm level and are
based on the Top Third of the rivals of a given firm in the Text-based Network Industry Classifications by
Hoberg and Phillips (2016). The fraction of MHHI held by exposed funds in the previous year is used as
an instrument. A dummy is defined when the ratio takes values in the top 25 percent of its distribution:
Ratio Top 25 Percent. I further control for the lagged MHHI ( TNIC MHHID Lagged. Columns 1 and 3
show the first stages of the regression. Columns 2 and 4 show the respective second stages. The sample
consists of all U.S. public firms with available data during the period 1997-2012. All control variables are
defined in the appendix. The controls variables are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for
error heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5%
significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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is observed in non-RD intensive industries, meaning that it is not simply explained by
di↵erences in innovative activities. RD-intensive industries are defined as in Brown
and Petersen (2009) - those with 3-digit SIC codes of 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384 and
737.
3.4 Conclusion
In summary, I proposed a new identification strategy, which can be used to study
the e↵ects of industry concentration due to common ownership. My strategy has
substantially better time-series and cross-sectional coverage relative to previously
used instruments. Furthermore, it is easy transparent and easy to implement. My
strategy builds on previous work on mutual fund outflows (Parise (2016), Harald and
Lai (2013) and Coval and Sta↵ord (2007)). Specifically, I first identify mutual funds
that are exposed to under-performing industries and are likely to face outflows. Then,
I calculate the proportion of the MHHI index such exposed funds are responsible for
in una↵ected industries. I show that this ratio strongly predicts future changes in
MHHI and cash holdings.
Armed with this new identification strategy, I confirm my findings from before
that higher industry concentration due to common ownership leads firms to hold
lower cash holdings. This finding provides support for precautionary theories of cash
holdings, in which firms maintain higher bu↵ers in the face of more competition. I
further show that firms di↵erentiate their products more when industry concentration
due to common ownership increases. My evidence suggests that this is not driven by
high-tech industries. Further, it is consistent with lower competition relaxing financial
constraints, reducing uncertainty and enabling firms to choose a more unique product
market strategy. The analysis of firm financial policy and product market di↵eren-
tiation illustrates the usefulness of my identification strategy in future research on
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Table 3.12: Product Similarity, Top Third MHHI and RD intensity: IV Results
RD intensive Non-RD intensive
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TNIC MHHIDQ Similarity TNIC MHHIDQ Similarity
Top Third Top Third
TNIC MHHIDQ Top Third -0.006 -0.259
(0.037) (0.063)⇤⇤⇤
Ratio Top 10 Percent -0.008 -0.008
(0.002)⇤⇤⇤ (0.001)⇤⇤⇤
TNIC MHHID Lagged 0.410 0.023 0.352 0.108
(0.009)⇤⇤⇤ (0.015) (0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.022)⇤⇤⇤
HHI Top Third -0.084 -0.008 -0.136 -0.048
(0.004)⇤⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤ (0.003)⇤⇤⇤ (0.009)⇤⇤⇤
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 24 38
Observations 15737 15737 30134 30134
R2 0.560 0.649 0.547 -0.403
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regressions of firm product market similarity with rivals on the instrumented
concentration measure MHHIDQ. MHHIDQ is constructed at the firm level and is based on the Top
Third of the rivals of a given firm in the Text-based Network Industry Classifications by Hoberg and
Phillips (2016). The fraction of MHHID held by exposed funds in the previous year is used as an
instrument. A dummy is defined when the ratio takes values in the top 25 percent of its distribution:
Ratio Top 25 Percent. I further control for the lagged MHHID ( TNIC MHHID Lagged. Columns 1
and 3 show the first stages of the regression for RD and non-RD intensive industries. Columns 2 and
4 show the respective second stages. The sample consists of all U.S. public firms with available data
during the period 1997-2012. All control variables are defined in the appendix. The controls variables
are from Bates et al. (2013) and are omitted for brevity. All continuous variables are winsorized at
the 1% and the 99% level. The estimations are adjusted for error heteroskedasticity and within-firm
error clustering. *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance.
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the e↵ects of industry concentration due to common ownership on various corporate
policies.
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Appendix A
Variable Description: Chapter 1
This is a list of the variables used in Chapter 1, how they were constructed and what
the data source is.
MHHID : Modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Delta or industry concentration
due to common ownership. See text for more details. (Source: Thomson Reuters and
Compustat).
MHHIDQ : Industry concentration due to common ownership by quasi-indexing
investors. See text for more details. (Source: Thomson Reuters, Compustat, Brian
Bushee’s website).
MHHIDD : Industry concentration due to common ownership by dedicated in-
vestors. See text for more details. (Source: Thomson Reuters, Compustat, Brian
Bushee’s website).
MHHIDT : Industry concentration due to common ownership by transient in-
vestors. See text for more details. (Source: Thomson Reuters, Compustat, Brian
Bushee’s website).
MHHID(Q)(D)(T) Top Third : MHHID(Q)(D)(T) constructed based on the top
third of the list of rivals in the Hoberg and Phillips Text-Based Network Industry
Classification data. (Source: Thomson Reuters, Compustat and Hoberg and Phillips
Data Library).
SIC300 MHHID(Q)(D)(T): MHHID(Q)(D)(T) constructed based on the SIC list
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of rivals. (Source: Thomson Reuters, Compustat and Hoberg and Phillips Data
Library).
Sales HHI : HHI with sales data. (Source: Compustat).
Sales HHI Top Third : HHI with sales data based on the top third of the list of
rivals in the Hoberg and Phillips Text-Based Network Industry Classification data.
(Source: Compustat and Hoberg and Phillips Data Library).
Ratio: The proportion of MHHID as of 2003, Q3 held by mutual funds involved in
the 2003 mutual fund scandal. See text for more details. (Source: Thomson Reuters).
Ratio Top 50 : A dummy variable equal to one for firms in the top 50% of the
distribution of the Ratio variable. See text for more details. (Source: Thomson
Reuters).
Institutional Ownership: Total institutional ownership of a given firm over the
four quarters preceding the fiscal year end. (Source: Thomson Reuters).
Cash: Cash [Compustat item che] over assets [at]. (Source: Compustat).
Market to Book : book value of assets [Compustat annual item at] plus the market
value of equity [Compustat annual items at+(csho*prcc f)] minus the book value of
equity and deferred taxes [Compustat annual item ceq+txdb], all over (book value of
assets [Compustat annual item at]+market value of assets. (Source: Compustat).
Firm Size: logarithm of assets [Compustat annual item at] multiplied by 100 and
divided by the GDP deflator in 2004. (Source: Compustat).
Cash Flow : earnings after interest, dividends and taxes and before depreciation
[Compustat items oibdp-xint-txt-dvc] divided by book assets [at]. (Source: Compus-
tat).
Net Working Capital : net working capital [Compustat item NWC] net of cash
[Compustat item che] divided by assets [at]. (Source: Compustat).
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Capex : The ratio of capital expenditures [Compustat item capx] plus acquisitions
[Compustat item aqc] divided by assets [at]. (Source: Compustat).
Dividend Dummy : equal to one in years in which a firm pays a common dividend
[Compustat item dvc]. (Source: Compustat).
Leverage: total debt [Compustat annual items dltt+dlc+dclo] divided by total
assets [Com- pustat annual item at]. (Source: Compustat).
RD : equal to one in years in which the firm has positive R&D expenditures [Com-
pustat item xrd]. (Source: Compustat).
Industry Sigma: The industry mean of the standard deviations of cash flows over
assets for the past 10 years. Industries are defined based on the TNIC classification in
Hoberg and Phillips (2016) (Source: Compustat, Hoberg and Phillips Data Library).
Appendix B
Variable Description: Chapter 2
This is a list of the variables used in Chapter 2, how they were constructed and what
the data source is.
CO sum: This is a measure at the firm-pair level. It is the fraction of total firm
value held by the common owners of these firms. (Source: Thomson Reuters).
CO(Q)(D)(T) sum: The CO sum measure due to quasi-indexing, dedicated or
transient invesstors. (Source: Thomson Reuters and Brian Bushee’s website).
CO product : This is a measure at the firm-pair level. It is the product of the
fraction of firm i’s shares held by its common owners with firm j and the fraction of
firm j’s shares held by its common owners with firm i. (Source: Thomson Reuters).
CO(Q)(D)(T) product : The CO product measure due to quasi-indexing, dedicated
or transient invesstors. (Source: Thomson Reuters and Brian Bushee’s website).
Product Similarity : For any two firms i and j this is a real number in the in-
terval [0,1] describing how similar the words used by firms i and j in their product
descriptions in 10-K filings are. (Source: Hoberg and Phillips Data Library).
Average Similarity : The average product market similarity between a firm and all
of its rivals. (Source: Hoberg and Phillips Data Library).
Scandal Ratio: The proportion of common ownership held by the scandal funds
in Q3, 2003. (Source: Thomson Reuters).
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High Scandal Ratio: A dummy variable equal to one for the pairs of firms in
the top 25% of the distribution of the Scandal Ratio variable. (Source: Thomson
Reuters).
Ratio (MHHID tables): The proportion of MHHID as of 2003, Q3 held by mutual
funds involved in the 2003 mutual fund scandal. See text for more details. (Source:
Thomson Reuters).
Ratio Top 50 (MHHID tables): A dummy variable equal to one for firms in the
top 50% of the distribution of the Ratio variable. See text for more details. (Source:
Thomson Reuters).
Stock Return Firm/Rival : The stock return over the 12 months before the fiscal
year end. (Source: CRSP).
MHHID(Q)(D)(T): Modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Delta or concentration
due to common ownership by quasi-indexing (Q), dedicated (D) or transient (T)
investors. (Source: Thomson Reuters and Compustat).
MHHID(Q)(D)(T) Top Third : Concentration due to common ownership by quasi-
indexing (Q), dedicated (D) or transient (T) investors based on the top third of the
list of rivals in the Hoberg and Phillips Text-Based Network Industry Classification
data. (Source: Thomson Reuters, Compustat and Hoberg and Phillips Data Library).
HHI Profits Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated using gross profits [revt-cogs]
(Source: Compustat).
HHI Revenues Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated using profitability [revt]
(Source: Compustat).
HHI Assets Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated using firm assets [at] (Source:
Compustat).
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Market Share Firm: Firm sales normalized by total industry sales (Source: Com-
pustat).
Firm Size: logarithm of assets [Compustat annual item at] multiplied by 100 and
divided by the GDP deflator in 2004. (Source: Compustat).
Market to Book : book value of assets [Compustat annual item at] plus the market
value of equity [Compustat annual items at+(csho*prcc f)] minus the book value of
equity and deferred taxes [Compustat annual item ceq+txdb], all over (book value of
assets [Compustat annual item at]+market value of assets. (Source: Compustat).
Institutional Ownership: Total institutional ownership of a given firm over the
four quarters preceding the fiscal year end. (Source: Thomson Reuters).
LNMV : Log of firm market value, calculated as prccf times csho (Source: Com-
pustat).
LNMVsq : LNMV squared (Source: Compustat).
ROA: Earnings [oibdp] over assets [at]. (Source: Compustat).
PPETA: Property, plant and equipment [ppent] over assets [at] (Source: Compu-
stat).
LNAGE : Log of 1 plus the age of the firm, measured as the di↵erence between the
current year and the first year the firm shows up in Compustat. (Source: Compustat).
Leverage: total debt [Compustat annual items dltt+dlc+dclo] divided by total
assets [Com- pustat annual item at]. (Source: Compustat).
Capex : The ratio of capital expenditures [Compustat item capx] plus acquisitions
[Compustat item aqc] divided by assets [at]. (Source: Compustat).
Appendix C
Variable Description: Chapter 3
This is a list of the variables used in Chapter 3, how they were constructed and what
the data source is.
Ratio (pairwise tables): The proportion of common ownership held by the exposed
funds. See text for more information. (Source: Thomson Reuters).
Dummy Ratio (pairwise tables): A dummy variable equal to one for the pairs
of firms in the top 10% of the distribution of the Ratio variable (pairwise tables).
(Source: Thomson Reuters).
Ratio (MHHID tables): The proportion of MHHID held by exposed funds. See
text for more details. (Source: Thomson Reuters).
Ratio Top 10 (MHHID tables): A dummy variable equal to one for firms in the
top 10% of the distribution of the Ratio variable (MHHID tables). See text for more
details. (Source: Thomson Reuters).
Ratio Top 25 (MHHID tables): A dummy variable equal to one for firms in the
top 25% of the distribution of the Ratio variable (MHHID tables). See text for more
details. (Source: Thomson Reuters).
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